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Raw built-in agents are too permissive for an internal product. The repo needs a safer default operating model for implementation, review, and release workflows.
Deliverables
hardened default primary agent
review-oriented subagent
slash commands for /implement, /review, /ship, and /handoff
explicit permission policy for dangerous shell patterns and write operations
Acceptance
default agent is not an unrestricted build clone
review workflow can run without edit access
release workflow cannot bypass explicit gates
Notes
Follow the thin-distribution approach from docs/ai-guardrails/adr/001-thin-distribution-over-deep-fork.md
This issue is in the now-required set for the MVP floor tracked in #16. It should stay focused on safe local-runtime workflows and should not silently absorb later CI or broader migration scope.
Starting implementation from the source canon and the local brief. Scope for this PR: guarded primary agent, read-only review subagent, and explicit implement/review/ship/handoff commands only. CI authority and broader migration stay out of scope per #16.
Activity
terisuke commentedon Apr 3, 2026
This issue is in the now-required set for the MVP floor tracked in #16. It should stay focused on safe local-runtime workflows and should not silently absorb later CI or broader migration scope.
terisuke commentedon Apr 3, 2026
Starting implementation from the source canon and the local brief. Scope for this PR: guarded primary agent, read-only review subagent, and explicit implement/review/ship/handoff commands only. CI authority and broader migration stay out of scope per #16.
feat: add safe agents and commands (#5)
feat: add safe agents and commands (#5) (#18)