Repository navigation
Distinguish invalid Dag access control from FAB backend failures - #74787
Closed
ephraimbuddy wants to merge 1 commit into
Closed
ephraimbuddy wants to merge 1 commit into
ephraimbuddy wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
Callers need to distinguish malformed Dag access control from permission backend failures so they can report invalid input without suppressing transient infrastructure errors. Existing FabException handlers remain compatible.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Superseded by #74788 after renaming the branch to
dag-processor-fab-validation.Report malformed Dag access-control definitions as validation errors. Backend failures keep their original exception type, allowing atomic parse publication to reject invalid metadata while retrying infrastructure failures.
Layer 1 of the seven-part split of #74233. This layer can be reviewed and merged independently.
Focused security tests: 49 passed, 1 skipped. Selected provider suites: 1,346 non-database tests passed (29 skipped); 1,057 database tests passed (6 skipped). One existing provider-discovery test timed out at 60 seconds, including an unchanged isolated retry. Regular and manual checks, all-provider mypy, and common.compat/FAB documentation builds passed.
Was generative AI tooling used to co-author this PR?
Generated-by: Codex (GPT-6) following the guidelines