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Consider using discourse/ruby-landlock to narrow file permissions #13
A worker runs as the same user as the supervisor, and that user must be able to write the socket directory. So a worker that achieves code execution can unlink work.sock and bind its own, and every later request arrives at its listener with the caller's descriptors attached.
Supervisor#verify_sockets records each socket's inode and stops the cell when it changes. That is detection, not prevention: the attacker still serves whatever arrives before the next check.
Every prevention available to an unprivileged container was ruled out, and the reasons are in that method's comment. A tighter directory mode is undone by the owner, the sticky bit grants the owner what it withholds from others, the immutable flag needs CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE, a uid per worker needs CAP_SETUID, and an abstract-namespace socket cannot be reached across network: none.
Landlock is the one that was not ruled out. It lets an unprivileged process apply an irreversible filesystem restriction to itself and its children, with no capability. A worker would give up write and unlink access to the socket directory immediately after the fork, before it touches an untrusted byte. Being irreversible is the property that matters here: there is nothing for the attacker to undo.
Worth considering at the same time, since a ruleset costs the same whether it names one directory or several:
the slot workspace, where a worker can read a concurrent request's staged files
/hotcell, which holds config.rb and the operations the supervisor loads at boot
Open questions: the kernel version floor, whether the runtime's seccomp profile permits the Landlock syscalls, what a cell does when they are unavailable, and whether a restriction that tight breaks a toolchain that writes where we did not expect.
Detection was built and withdrawn. Recording why, so it is not rebuilt.
The supervisor recorded each socket's inode at boot and re-checked both in the run loop, stopping the cell on a change or an unlink. wait_for was capped at one second, because a stolen listener never becomes readable and an event-driven loop would never wake to notice.
An attacker evades it.link preserves the inode under a second name, so the theft does not have to destroy the original socket. Measured:
supervisor binds, inode 223078
attacker rebinds, inode 223079 (a check here catches it)
traffic reaches the impostor: true
attacker restores, inode 223078 (matches: true)
traffic reaches the supervisor: true
The attacker links the socket aside, unlinks the name, binds an impostor, takes what arrives, then unlinks theirs and renames the saved link back. Any burst shorter than the check interval is invisible, and a shorter interval only shortens the burst. renameat2 with RENAME_EXCHANGE does the same thing atomically.
It also cost more than it bought. An adversarial review found two further problems:
inode mapped every SystemCallError to nil, and the check then compared nil == nil and passed. One transient stat failure at boot, or an unlink landing between the bind and the record, gave the cell a baseline that could never mismatch. The control would silently stop existing.
During an overlapping restart, two cells share the volume. The new one binds, the old one sees a changed inode and stops, and its shutdown unlinks whatever now holds both names, which is the new cell's sockets. A restart cascade on an ordinary deploy.
File.stat has no timeout and follows symlinks, so a worker could aim it at a hung mount and park pid 1 while every in-flight deadline went unenforced.
So there is no cheap detection worth having, and the gap is stated in docs/DESIGN.md under "Worker isolation" instead. Landlock remains the one prevention that fits an unprivileged container.
Landlock closes this. Everything below is measured against hotcell:example run with --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true --network none, and it is enough to implement from.
The kernel reports Landlock ABI 9. Docker's default seccomp profile permits the syscalls, and no-new-privileges is no obstacle: Landlock requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and the gem sets it. That
answers the seccomp and kernel-floor questions above.
What a write-class ruleset denies
Handle the write rights, grant them only on the slot directory, and never name the socket directory:
Attempt
Result
worker unlinks work.sock
EACCES
worker binds an impostor socket
EACCES
tool unlinks work.sock after execve
EACCES
setsid grandchild unlinks work.sock
EACCES
A child inherits the ruleset across fork and execve, so the escape at Supervisor#become_worker stops
being a route to this. The escapee still leaves the process group and still runs untimed until pids-limit ends it. It no longer holds a stolen listener.
connect to work.sock stays allowed. Landlock does not mediate pathname AF_UNIX connections. Only the
unlink and the re-bind are denied.
Reads and descriptor writes stay outside the handled mask:
Operation
Result
write through an already-open descriptor
allowed
read-reopen of source.fd_path
allowed
write-reopen of destination.fd_path
EACCES
The last row drives prerequisite 1. The kernel resolves /dev/fd/N to the backing file and checks that
file's own path ancestry. In deployment that file is in the application container's mount tree, which the
cell cannot name, so no allowlist can permit the write.
The dependency
discourse/ruby-landlock 0.4.1, MIT. It is a native
extension with no precompiled binaries, so the cell image compiles it. It goes in hotcell-server.gemspec and in hotcell-client/lib/hot_cell/install/Gemfile.tt.
ext/landlock/extconf.rb probes linux/landlock.h without aborting, so the build may succeed off Linux.
Check that it builds on Darwin before making the dependency unconditional, and gate it by platform if not. Landlock.abi_version returns 0 where the syscall is absent and Landlock.supported? returns false, so
the runtime degrades on its own.
Change 1: write confinement
In Supervisor#become_worker, after Process.setpgid 0, 0. The child is single-threaded there, which is
what Landlock.restrict! requires.
make_sock denies the impostor bind and remove_file denies the unlink. Rights outside the mask are
unrestricted, so reads and execve are untouched.
Four things that will otherwise cost a day:
Use paths:, never write:.Landlock::WRITE_RIGHTS contains read_file and read_dir, so the write: keyword puts reads into the handled mask and denies them across the filesystem. Only paths:
with an explicit rights list builds a write-only mask.
Anchor on File.dirname(slot.home), which is <workspace>/<n>. A rule binds an inode, and Slot#make_home creates a new one for every request, so a rule on slot.home is dead after the first
request. The parent also covers the home.discarded-* trees Slot#sweep removes.
Supervisor#prepare_directories does not create <workspace>/<n>.Native.add_path_rule opens the
path, so add a mkdir_p there.
refer is masked out below ABI 2, which denies cross-directory renames. Every rename here is
same-directory, so ABI 1 is still enough.
Change 2: verify_landlock!
In Supervisor, beside verify_ptrace_scope! and called from the same place. Copy its split: raise ConfigurationError on Linux when Landlock.abi_version is 0, and log a warning elsewhere. This is the
answer to "what a cell does when they are unavailable". Record the new precondition next to the ptrace_scope one in docs/DEPLOYMENT.md.
Change 3: scope: [:signal]
A separate restrict! call, guarded on Landlock.abi_version >= 6. Policy#scope_for raises UnsupportedError below ABI 6, so folding it into change 1 would fail the whole policy on kernels 5.13
to 6.11.
It closes the accepted risk at Supervisor#trap_signals:
Direction
Result
worker to supervisor
EPERM
worker to sibling worker
EPERM
worker to its own tool
allowed
supervisor to restricted worker
allowed
The last two rows are the safety argument: a worker keeps control of its own tools, and the deadline kill
still reaches the worker.
Half of that risk is not denial of service. A worker can SIGSTOP a sibling and hold that request's
staged files on the tmpfs, which widens the window docs/DESIGN.md relies on when it bounds file exposure
to requests in flight.
Prerequisite 1: stage the ffmpeg poster frame
previewers/video/ffmpeg.rb writes through destination.fd_path, which the table above shows is denied.
Move it to the staged pattern Previewers::Pdf uses. Three edits:
Pass destination.path(extension: "jpg") as the output argument in place of destination.fd_path.
Call destination.adopt destination.path(extension: "jpg") after run!.
Replace bytes: produced!(destination.to_io.stat.size, "ffmpeg"). A staged output does not reach the
descriptor until Output#post, which runs later in Worker#perform, so that expression returns 0 and produced! raises UnreadableDocument. Measure the staged file.
Drop destination.to_io from pass:; only the source descriptor is still needed. The comment above run! argues for the direct write and says a staged output leaves the caller's file empty on a mid-write
failure. Staging is the behaviour now, so rewrite it.
Prerequisite 2: set TMPDIR
Operation#tool_environment sets no TMPDIR, so ImageMagick's pixel cache and libvips vips_tmpfile
spill into /tmp. Point TMPDIR at the slot home.
Do not grant /tmp in the ruleset instead. Supervisor defaults workspace to File.join(Dir.tmpdir, "hotcell-workspace"), so granting /tmp restores cross-slot writes.
MagickOperation needs separate handling. mini_magick spawns magick itself rather than going through run_tool, so tool_environment never reaches it. MiniMagick.cli_env and MiniMagick.tmpdir are the
levers, and neither is set for this today.
Prerequisite 3: cover the spill paths
Twenty test files boot a real cell through HotCell::TestCell and drive the real toolchain, so a missing
grant on any exercised path fails loudly and needs no new test.
Spills are the exception, because they are size-dependent branches. The largest fixture is activestorage-hotcell-server/test/fixtures/large.png at 962KB and 400x400, far below any memory limit
that pushes the pixel cache to disk. Force the branch instead of adding a large fixture: a low MAGICK_MEMORY_LIMIT for ImageMagick, and VIPS_DISC_THRESHOLD for libvips. magick_environment_test.rb already drives a booted cell with ImageMagick environment variables set, and
is the model to copy.
Do this whether or not the rest lands. We do not currently test where these tools write intermediate
files.
Reproducing any of the above
docker run --rm --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true --network none \
-v <ruby-landlock>/lib:/gem/lib:ro hotcell:example ruby -I/gem/lib -e '<probe>'
For the destination.fd_path denial the backing file must sit in a mount the policy never grants.
Bind-mount a host directory and open the file there.
Deferred: the read side
Handling read rights as well closes both residuals docs/DESIGN.md records under worker isolation.
Measured: a sibling slot's files and /proc/self/environ both return EACCES. That reaches what the
design calls unfixable, and it beats hidepid=2, which needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
It also denies every source.fd_path re-open, for the reason under the second table, so every input would
have to be staged — which puts large inputs back on the tmpfs under RLIMIT_FSIZE. Separate decision, and
not a default.
Correction to the issue text
There is no Supervisor#verify_sockets. docs/DESIGN.md records that the inode check was tried and
withdrawn, because an attacker hard-links the original aside, serves from an impostor, and renames it back.
Findings from #23, which is closed into this. In #23 a worker replaces its slot directory with a symlink to a sibling's, and every later request on either slot can fail until the cell restarts.
Measured with change 1's rights list on Linux 7.2.6, Landlock ABI 10:
Attempt
No Landlock
Grant on <workspace>/0
Grant on <workspace>
create a home in its own slot
ok
ok
ok
rename a sibling's home within <workspace>/1
ok
EACCES
ok
rename its own slot directory aside
ok
EACCES
ok
open /dev/null for writing
ok
EACCES
EACCES
open /dev/null for writing, with a write_file + truncate rule on it
Grant write_file and truncate on /dev/null. Nothing in hotcell-server opens it after the fork: Log.null opens it in the supervisor, and the worker inherits the descriptor. A tool that redirects output to /dev/null would fail with EACCES, though. The table's last row shows the rule allows it.
Drop prerequisite 2. The worker already sets TMPDIR to the home (worker.rb), and MagickOperation forwards it to magick (CHANGELOG.md).
Activity
flavorjones commentedon Aug 18, 2026
Detection was built and withdrawn. Recording why, so it is not rebuilt.
The supervisor recorded each socket's inode at
bootand re-checked both in the run loop, stopping the cell on a change or an unlink.wait_forwas capped at one second, because a stolen listener never becomes readable and an event-driven loop would never wake to notice.An attacker evades it.
linkpreserves the inode under a second name, so the theft does not have to destroy the original socket. Measured:The attacker links the socket aside, unlinks the name, binds an impostor, takes what arrives, then unlinks theirs and renames the saved link back. Any burst shorter than the check interval is invisible, and a shorter interval only shortens the burst.
renameat2withRENAME_EXCHANGEdoes the same thing atomically.It also cost more than it bought. An adversarial review found two further problems:
inodemapped everySystemCallErrortonil, and the check then comparednil == niland passed. One transient stat failure at boot, or an unlink landing between the bind and the record, gave the cell a baseline that could never mismatch. The control would silently stop existing.shutdownunlinks whatever now holds both names, which is the new cell's sockets. A restart cascade on an ordinary deploy.File.stathas no timeout and follows symlinks, so a worker could aim it at a hung mount and park pid 1 while every in-flight deadline went unenforced.So there is no cheap detection worth having, and the gap is stated in
docs/DESIGN.mdunder "Worker isolation" instead. Landlock remains the one prevention that fits an unprivileged container.flavorjones commentedon Aug 21, 2026
Landlock closes this. Everything below is measured against
hotcell:examplerun with--cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true --network none, and it is enough to implement from.The kernel reports Landlock ABI 9. Docker's default seccomp profile permits the syscalls, and
no-new-privilegesis no obstacle: Landlock requiresPR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVSand the gem sets it. Thatanswers the seccomp and kernel-floor questions above.
What a write-class ruleset denies
Handle the write rights, grant them only on the slot directory, and never name the socket directory:
work.sockEACCESEACCESwork.sockafterexecveEACCESsetsidgrandchild unlinkswork.sockEACCESA child inherits the ruleset across
forkandexecve, so the escape atSupervisor#become_workerstopsbeing a route to this. The escapee still leaves the process group and still runs untimed until
pids-limitends it. It no longer holds a stolen listener.connecttowork.sockstays allowed. Landlock does not mediate pathnameAF_UNIXconnections. Only theunlink and the re-bind are denied.
Reads and descriptor writes stay outside the handled mask:
source.fd_pathdestination.fd_pathEACCESThe last row drives prerequisite 1. The kernel resolves
/dev/fd/Nto the backing file and checks thatfile's own path ancestry. In deployment that file is in the application container's mount tree, which the
cell cannot name, so no allowlist can permit the write.
The dependency
discourse/ruby-landlock0.4.1, MIT. It is a nativeextension with no precompiled binaries, so the cell image compiles it. It goes in
hotcell-server.gemspecand inhotcell-client/lib/hot_cell/install/Gemfile.tt.ext/landlock/extconf.rbprobeslinux/landlock.hwithout aborting, so the build may succeed off Linux.Check that it builds on Darwin before making the dependency unconditional, and gate it by platform if not.
Landlock.abi_versionreturns 0 where the syscall is absent andLandlock.supported?returns false, sothe runtime degrades on its own.
Change 1: write confinement
In
Supervisor#become_worker, afterProcess.setpgid 0, 0. The child is single-threaded there, which iswhat
Landlock.restrict!requires.make_sockdenies the impostor bind andremove_filedenies the unlink. Rights outside the mask areunrestricted, so reads and
execveare untouched.Four things that will otherwise cost a day:
paths:, neverwrite:.Landlock::WRITE_RIGHTScontainsread_fileandread_dir, so thewrite:keyword puts reads into the handled mask and denies them across the filesystem. Onlypaths:with an explicit rights list builds a write-only mask.
File.dirname(slot.home), which is<workspace>/<n>. A rule binds an inode, andSlot#make_homecreates a new one for every request, so a rule onslot.homeis dead after the firstrequest. The parent also covers the
home.discarded-*treesSlot#sweepremoves.Supervisor#prepare_directoriesdoes not create<workspace>/<n>.Native.add_path_ruleopens thepath, so add a
mkdir_pthere.referis masked out below ABI 2, which denies cross-directory renames. Every rename here issame-directory, so ABI 1 is still enough.
Change 2:
verify_landlock!In
Supervisor, besideverify_ptrace_scope!and called from the same place. Copy its split: raiseConfigurationErroron Linux whenLandlock.abi_versionis 0, and log a warning elsewhere. This is theanswer to "what a cell does when they are unavailable". Record the new precondition next to the
ptrace_scopeone indocs/DEPLOYMENT.md.Change 3:
scope: [:signal]A separate
restrict!call, guarded onLandlock.abi_version >= 6.Policy#scope_forraisesUnsupportedErrorbelow ABI 6, so folding it into change 1 would fail the whole policy on kernels 5.13to 6.11.
It closes the accepted risk at
Supervisor#trap_signals:EPERMEPERMThe last two rows are the safety argument: a worker keeps control of its own tools, and the deadline kill
still reaches the worker.
Half of that risk is not denial of service. A worker can
SIGSTOPa sibling and hold that request'sstaged files on the tmpfs, which widens the window
docs/DESIGN.mdrelies on when it bounds file exposureto requests in flight.
Prerequisite 1: stage the ffmpeg poster frame
previewers/video/ffmpeg.rbwrites throughdestination.fd_path, which the table above shows is denied.Move it to the staged pattern
Previewers::Pdfuses. Three edits:destination.path(extension: "jpg")as the output argument in place ofdestination.fd_path.destination.adopt destination.path(extension: "jpg")afterrun!.bytes: produced!(destination.to_io.stat.size, "ffmpeg"). A staged output does not reach thedescriptor until
Output#post, which runs later inWorker#perform, so that expression returns 0 andproduced!raisesUnreadableDocument. Measure the staged file.Drop
destination.to_iofrompass:; only the source descriptor is still needed. The comment aboverun!argues for the direct write and says a staged output leaves the caller's file empty on a mid-writefailure. Staging is the behaviour now, so rewrite it.
Prerequisite 2: set
TMPDIROperation#tool_environmentsets noTMPDIR, so ImageMagick's pixel cache and libvipsvips_tmpfilespill into
/tmp. PointTMPDIRat the slot home.Do not grant
/tmpin the ruleset instead.SupervisordefaultsworkspacetoFile.join(Dir.tmpdir, "hotcell-workspace"), so granting/tmprestores cross-slot writes.MagickOperationneeds separate handling. mini_magick spawnsmagickitself rather than going throughrun_tool, sotool_environmentnever reaches it.MiniMagick.cli_envandMiniMagick.tmpdirare thelevers, and neither is set for this today.
Prerequisite 3: cover the spill paths
Twenty test files boot a real cell through
HotCell::TestCelland drive the real toolchain, so a missinggrant on any exercised path fails loudly and needs no new test.
Spills are the exception, because they are size-dependent branches. The largest fixture is
activestorage-hotcell-server/test/fixtures/large.pngat 962KB and 400x400, far below any memory limitthat pushes the pixel cache to disk. Force the branch instead of adding a large fixture: a low
MAGICK_MEMORY_LIMITfor ImageMagick, andVIPS_DISC_THRESHOLDfor libvips.magick_environment_test.rbalready drives a booted cell with ImageMagick environment variables set, andis the model to copy.
Do this whether or not the rest lands. We do not currently test where these tools write intermediate
files.
Reproducing any of the above
For the
destination.fd_pathdenial the backing file must sit in a mount the policy never grants.Bind-mount a host directory and open the file there.
Deferred: the read side
Handling read rights as well closes both residuals
docs/DESIGN.mdrecords under worker isolation.Measured: a sibling slot's files and
/proc/self/environboth returnEACCES. That reaches what thedesign calls unfixable, and it beats
hidepid=2, which needsCAP_SYS_ADMIN.It also denies every
source.fd_pathre-open, for the reason under the second table, so every input wouldhave to be staged — which puts large inputs back on the tmpfs under
RLIMIT_FSIZE. Separate decision, andnot a default.
Correction to the issue text
There is no
Supervisor#verify_sockets.docs/DESIGN.mdrecords that the inode check was tried andwithdrawn, because an attacker hard-links the original aside, serves from an impostor, and renames it back.
flavorjones commentedon Sep 29, 2026
Findings from #23, which is closed into this. In #23 a worker replaces its slot directory with a symlink to a sibling's, and every later request on either slot can fail until the cell restarts.
Measured with change 1's rights list on Linux 7.2.6, Landlock ABI 10:
<workspace>/0<workspace><workspace>/1EACCESEACCES/dev/nullfor writingEACCESEACCES/dev/nullfor writing, with awrite_file+truncaterule on itRecommendations:
File.dirname(slot.home), and test it. Granting the whole workspace reopens A worker can replace its slot directory, and make_home follows the replacement #23. Add tests that rename the slot directory aside and rename a sibling's home, so that widening the grant fails them.write_fileandtruncateon/dev/null. Nothing inhotcell-serveropens it after the fork:Log.nullopens it in the supervisor, and the worker inherits the descriptor. A tool that redirects output to/dev/nullwould fail withEACCES, though. The table's last row shows the rule allows it.TMPDIRto the home (worker.rb), andMagickOperationforwards it tomagick(CHANGELOG.md).