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ceph: additional debugfs output#5

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jcsp merged 2 commits intotestingfrom
wip-9466
Sep 24, 2014
Merged

ceph: additional debugfs output#5
jcsp merged 2 commits intotestingfrom
wip-9466

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@jcsp jcsp commented Sep 15, 2014

MDS session state and client global ID is
useful instrumentation when testing.

Signed-off-by: John Spray john.spray@redhat.com

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jcsp commented Sep 15, 2014

Tested this by running and checking that expected data appears:

/sys/kernel/debug/ceph/e6696eb2-31e7-4046-a4e8-d8a6bb326de3.client4114# cat mds_sessions
global_id 4114
name "1"
mds.0 open

@ukernel ukernel force-pushed the testing branch 5 times, most recently from 1315b31 to 5ea9d0f Compare September 18, 2014 01:04
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there is a static function 'session_state_name' in mds_client.c,why not just export it. Rest of change looks good

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jcsp commented Sep 19, 2014

Pushed update to use existing session_state_name function

John Spray added 2 commits September 24, 2014 15:15
...so that it can be used from the ceph debugfs
code when dumping session info.

Signed-off-by: John Spray <john.spray@redhat.com>
MDS session state and client global ID is
useful instrumentation when testing.

Signed-off-by: John Spray <john.spray@redhat.com>
@jcsp jcsp merged this pull request into testing Sep 24, 2014
@jcsp jcsp deleted the wip-9466 branch September 24, 2014 15:19
ukernel pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 25, 2014
This reverts commit fc1b253 ("PCI: Don't scan random busses in
pci_scan_bridge()") because it breaks CardBus on some machines.

David tested a Dell Latitude D505 that worked like this prior to
fc1b253:

    pci 0000:00:1e.0: PCI bridge to [bus 01]
    pci 0000:01:01.0: CardBus bridge to [bus 02-05]

Note that the 01:01.0 CardBus bridge has a bus number aperture of
[bus 02-05], but those buses are all outside the 00:1e.0 PCI bridge bus
number aperture, so accesses to buses 02-05 never reach CardBus.  This is
later patched up by yenta_fixup_parent_bridge(), which changes the
subordinate bus number of the 00:1e.0 PCI bridge:

    pci_bus 0000:01: Raising subordinate bus# of parent bus (#1) from #1 to #5

With fc1b253, pci_scan_bridge() fails immediately when it notices that
we can't allocate a valid secondary bus number for the CardBus bridge, and
CardBus doesn't work at all:

    pci 0000:01:01.0: can't allocate child bus 01 from [bus 01]

I'd prefer to fix this by integrating the yenta_fixup_parent_bridge() logic
into pci_scan_bridge() so we fix the bus number apertures up front.  But
I don't think we can do that before v3.17, so I'm going to revert this to
avoid the problem while we're working on the long-term fix.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83441
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1409303414-5196-1-git-send-email-david.henningsson@canonical.com
Reported-by: David Henningsson <david.henningsson@canonical.com>
Tested-by: David Henningsson <david.henningsson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v3.15+
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2014
We can summarize the roll forward recovery scenarios as follows.

[Term] F: fsync_mark, D: dentry_mark

1. inode(x) | CP | inode(x) | dnode(F)
-> Update the latest inode(x).

2. inode(x) | CP | inode(F) | dnode(F)
-> No problem.

3. inode(x) | CP | dnode(F) | inode(x)
-> Recover to the latest dnode(F), and drop the last inode(x)

4. inode(x) | CP | dnode(F) | inode(F)
-> No problem.

5. CP | inode(x) | dnode(F)
-> The inode(DF) was missing. Should drop this dnode(F).

6. CP | inode(DF) | dnode(F)
-> No problem.

7. CP | dnode(F) | inode(DF)
-> If f2fs_iget fails, then goto next to find inode(DF).

8. CP | dnode(F) | inode(x)
-> If f2fs_iget fails, then goto next to find inode(DF).
   But it will fail due to no inode(DF).

So, this patch adds some missing points such as #1, #5, #7, and #8.

Signed-off-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2014
I'm getting the spew below when booting with Haswell (Xeon
E5-2699 v3) CPUs and the "Cluster-on-Die" (CoD) feature enabled
in the BIOS.  It seems similar to the issue that some folks from
AMD ran in to on their systems and addressed in this commit:

  161270f ("x86/smp: Fix topology checks on AMD MCM CPUs")

Both these Intel and AMD systems break an assumption which is
being enforced by topology_sane(): a socket may not contain more
than one NUMA node.

AMD special-cased their system by looking for a cpuid flag.  The
Intel mode is dependent on BIOS options and I do not know of a
way which it is enumerated other than the tables being parsed
during the CPU bringup process.  In other words, we have to trust
the ACPI tables <shudder>.

This detects the situation where a NUMA node occurs at a place in
the middle of the "CPU" sched domains.  It replaces the default
topology with one that relies on the NUMA information from the
firmware (SRAT table) for all levels of sched domains above the
hyperthreads.

This also fixes a sysfs bug.  We used to freak out when we saw
the "mc" group cross a node boundary, so we stopped building the
MC group.  MC gets exported as the 'core_siblings_list' in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/topology/ and this caused CPUs with
the same 'physical_package_id' to not be listed together in
'core_siblings_list'.  This violates a statement from
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu:

	core_siblings: internal kernel map of cpu#'s hardware threads
	within the same physical_package_id.

	core_siblings_list: human-readable list of the logical CPU
	numbers within the same physical_package_id as cpu#.

The sysfs effects here cause an issue with the hwloc tool where
it gets confused and thinks there are more sockets than are
physically present.

Before this patch, there are two packages:

# cd /sys/devices/system/cpu/
# cat cpu*/topology/physical_package_id | sort | uniq -c
     18 0
     18 1

But 4 _sets_ of core siblings:

# cat cpu*/topology/core_siblings_list | sort | uniq -c
      9 0-8
      9 18-26
      9 27-35
      9 9-17

After this set, there are only 2 sets of core siblings, which
is what we expect for a 2-socket system.

# cat cpu*/topology/physical_package_id | sort | uniq -c
     18 0
     18 1
# cat cpu*/topology/core_siblings_list | sort | uniq -c
     18 0-17
     18 18-35

Example spew:
...
	NMI watchdog: enabled on all CPUs, permanently consumes one hw-PMU counter.
	 #2  #3  #4  #5  #6  #7  #8
	.... node  #1, CPUs:    #9
	------------[ cut here ]------------
	WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 0 at /home/ak/hle/linux-hle-2.6/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:306 topology_sane.isra.2+0x74/0x90()
	sched: CPU #9's mc-sibling CPU #0 is not on the same node! [node: 1 != 0]. Ignoring dependency.
	Modules linked in:
	CPU: 9 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/9 Not tainted 3.17.0-rc1-00293-g8e01c4d-dirty #631
	Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WTT/S2600WTT, BIOS GRNDSDP1.86B.0036.R05.1407140519 07/14/2014
	0000000000000009 ffff88046ddabe00 ffffffff8172e485 ffff88046ddabe48
	ffff88046ddabe38 ffffffff8109691d 000000000000b001 0000000000000009
	ffff88086fc12580 000000000000b020 0000000000000009 ffff88046ddabe98
	Call Trace:
	[<ffffffff8172e485>] dump_stack+0x45/0x56
	[<ffffffff8109691d>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7d/0xa0
	[<ffffffff8109698c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x50
	[<ffffffff81074f94>] topology_sane.isra.2+0x74/0x90
	[<ffffffff8107530e>] set_cpu_sibling_map+0x31e/0x4f0
	[<ffffffff8107568d>] start_secondary+0x1ad/0x240
	---[ end trace 3fe5f587a9fcde61 ]---
	#10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17
	.... node  #2, CPUs:   #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 #24 #25 #26
	.... node  #3, CPUs:   #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 #32 #33 #34 #35

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
[ Added LLC domain and s/match_mc/match_die/ ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: brice.goglin@gmail.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140918193334.C065EBCE@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2014
1.
the library includes a trivial set of BPF syscall wrappers:
int bpf_create_map(int key_size, int value_size, int max_entries);
int bpf_update_elem(int fd, void *key, void *value);
int bpf_lookup_elem(int fd, void *key, void *value);
int bpf_delete_elem(int fd, void *key);
int bpf_get_next_key(int fd, void *key, void *next_key);
int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
		  const struct sock_filter_int *insns, int insn_len,
		  const char *license);
bpf_prog_load() stores verifier log into global bpf_log_buf[] array

and BPF_*() macros to build instructions

2.
test stubs configure eBPF infra with 'unspec' map and program types.
These are fake types used by user space testsuite only.

3.
verifier tests valid and invalid programs and expects predefined
error log messages from kernel.
40 tests so far.

$ sudo ./test_verifier
 #0 add+sub+mul OK
 #1 unreachable OK
 #2 unreachable2 OK
 #3 out of range jump OK
 #4 out of range jump2 OK
 #5 test1 ld_imm64 OK
 ...

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2014
The boot loader inode (inode #5) should never be visible in the
directory hierarchy, but it's possible if the file system is corrupted
that there will be a directory entry that points at inode #5.  In
order to avoid accidentally trashing it, when such a directory inode
is opened, the inode will be marked as a bad inode, so that it's not
possible to modify (or read) the inode from userspace.

Unfortunately, when we unlink this (invalid/illegal) directory entry,
we will put the bad inode on the ophan list, and then when try to
unlink the directory, we don't actually remove the bad inode from the
orphan list before freeing in-memory inode structure.  This means the
in-memory orphan list is corrupted, leading to a kernel oops.

In addition, avoid truncating a bad inode in ext4_destroy_inode(),
since truncating the boot loader inode is not a smart thing to do.

Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sami.liedes@iki.fi>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2014
For commit ocfs2 journal, ocfs2 journal thread will acquire the mutex
osb->journal->j_trans_barrier and wake up jbd2 commit thread, then it
will wait until jbd2 commit thread done. In order journal mode, jbd2
needs flushing dirty data pages first, and this needs get page lock.
So osb->journal->j_trans_barrier should be got before page lock.

But ocfs2_write_zero_page() and ocfs2_write_begin_inline() obey this
locking order, and this will cause deadlock and hung the whole cluster.

One deadlock catched is the following:

PID: 13449  TASK: ffff8802e2f08180  CPU: 31  COMMAND: "oracle"
 #0 [ffff8802ee3f79b0] __schedule at ffffffff8150a524
 #1 [ffff8802ee3f7a58] schedule at ffffffff8150acbf
 #2 [ffff8802ee3f7a68] rwsem_down_failed_common at ffffffff8150cb85
 #3 [ffff8802ee3f7ad8] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff8150cc55
 #4 [ffff8802ee3f7ae8] call_rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff812617a4
 #5 [ffff8802ee3f7b50] ocfs2_start_trans at ffffffffa0498919 [ocfs2]
 #6 [ffff8802ee3f7ba0] ocfs2_zero_start_ordered_transaction at ffffffffa048b2b8 [ocfs2]
 #7 [ffff8802ee3f7bf0] ocfs2_write_zero_page at ffffffffa048e9bd [ocfs2]
 #8 [ffff8802ee3f7c80] ocfs2_zero_extend_range at ffffffffa048ec83 [ocfs2]
 #9 [ffff8802ee3f7ce0] ocfs2_zero_extend at ffffffffa048edfd [ocfs2]
 #10 [ffff8802ee3f7d50] ocfs2_extend_file at ffffffffa049079e [ocfs2]
 #11 [ffff8802ee3f7da0] ocfs2_setattr at ffffffffa04910ed [ocfs2]
 #12 [ffff8802ee3f7e70] notify_change at ffffffff81187d29
 #13 [ffff8802ee3f7ee0] do_truncate at ffffffff8116bbc1
 #14 [ffff8802ee3f7f50] sys_ftruncate at ffffffff8116bcbd
 #15 [ffff8802ee3f7f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81515142
    RIP: 00007f8de750c6f7  RSP: 00007fffe786e478  RFLAGS: 00000206
    RAX: 000000000000004d  RBX: ffffffff81515142  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000200  RSI: 0000000000028400  RDI: 000000000000000d
    RBP: 00007fffe786e040   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 000000000000000d
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000206  R12: 000000000000000d
    R13: 00007fffe786e710  R14: 00007f8de70f8340  R15: 0000000000028400
    ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

crash64> bt
PID: 7610   TASK: ffff88100fd56140  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "ocfs2cmt"
 #0 [ffff88100f4d1c50] __schedule at ffffffff8150a524
 #1 [ffff88100f4d1cf8] schedule at ffffffff8150acbf
 #2 [ffff88100f4d1d08] jbd2_log_wait_commit at ffffffffa01274fd [jbd2]
 #3 [ffff88100f4d1d98] jbd2_journal_flush at ffffffffa01280b4 [jbd2]
 #4 [ffff88100f4d1dd8] ocfs2_commit_cache at ffffffffa0499b14 [ocfs2]
 #5 [ffff88100f4d1e38] ocfs2_commit_thread at ffffffffa0499d38 [ocfs2]
 #6 [ffff88100f4d1ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090db6
 #7 [ffff88100f4d1f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81516284

crash64> bt
PID: 7609   TASK: ffff88100f2d4480  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "jbd2/dm-20-86"
 #0 [ffff88100def3920] __schedule at ffffffff8150a524
 #1 [ffff88100def39c8] schedule at ffffffff8150acbf
 #2 [ffff88100def39d8] io_schedule at ffffffff8150ad6c
 #3 [ffff88100def39f8] sleep_on_page at ffffffff8111069e
 #4 [ffff88100def3a08] __wait_on_bit_lock at ffffffff8150b30a
 #5 [ffff88100def3a58] __lock_page at ffffffff81110687
 #6 [ffff88100def3ab8] write_cache_pages at ffffffff8111b752
 #7 [ffff88100def3be8] generic_writepages at ffffffff8111b901
 #8 [ffff88100def3c48] journal_submit_data_buffers at ffffffffa0120f67 [jbd2]
 #9 [ffff88100def3cf8] jbd2_journal_commit_transaction at ffffffffa0121372[jbd2]
 #10 [ffff88100def3e68] kjournald2 at ffffffffa0127a86 [jbd2]
 #11 [ffff88100def3ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090db6
 #12 [ffff88100def3f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81516284

Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 3, 2014
This patch wires up the new syscall sys_bpf() on powerpc.

Passes the tests in samples/bpf:

    #0 add+sub+mul OK
    #1 unreachable OK
    #2 unreachable2 OK
    #3 out of range jump OK
    #4 out of range jump2 OK
    #5 test1 ld_imm64 OK
    #6 test2 ld_imm64 OK
    #7 test3 ld_imm64 OK
    #8 test4 ld_imm64 OK
    #9 test5 ld_imm64 OK
    #10 no bpf_exit OK
    #11 loop (back-edge) OK
    #12 loop2 (back-edge) OK
    #13 conditional loop OK
    #14 read uninitialized register OK
    #15 read invalid register OK
    #16 program doesn't init R0 before exit OK
    #17 stack out of bounds OK
    #18 invalid call insn1 OK
    #19 invalid call insn2 OK
    #20 invalid function call OK
    #21 uninitialized stack1 OK
    #22 uninitialized stack2 OK
    #23 check valid spill/fill OK
    #24 check corrupted spill/fill OK
    #25 invalid src register in STX OK
    #26 invalid dst register in STX OK
    #27 invalid dst register in ST OK
    #28 invalid src register in LDX OK
    #29 invalid dst register in LDX OK
    #30 junk insn OK
    #31 junk insn2 OK
    #32 junk insn3 OK
    #33 junk insn4 OK
    #34 junk insn5 OK
    #35 misaligned read from stack OK
    #36 invalid map_fd for function call OK
    #37 don't check return value before access OK
    #38 access memory with incorrect alignment OK
    #39 sometimes access memory with incorrect alignment OK
    #40 jump test 1 OK
    #41 jump test 2 OK
    #42 jump test 3 OK
    #43 jump test 4 OK

Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
[mpe: test using samples/bpf]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2014
commit e2bfb08 upstream.

The boot loader inode (inode #5) should never be visible in the
directory hierarchy, but it's possible if the file system is corrupted
that there will be a directory entry that points at inode #5.  In
order to avoid accidentally trashing it, when such a directory inode
is opened, the inode will be marked as a bad inode, so that it's not
possible to modify (or read) the inode from userspace.

Unfortunately, when we unlink this (invalid/illegal) directory entry,
we will put the bad inode on the ophan list, and then when try to
unlink the directory, we don't actually remove the bad inode from the
orphan list before freeing in-memory inode structure.  This means the
in-memory orphan list is corrupted, leading to a kernel oops.

In addition, avoid truncating a bad inode in ext4_destroy_inode(),
since truncating the boot loader inode is not a smart thing to do.

Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sami.liedes@iki.fi>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 20, 2015
David reported that perf can segfault when adding an uprobe event like
this:

  $ perf probe -x /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so -a 'malloc  size=%di'

  (gdb) bt
  #0  parse_eh_frame_hdr (hdr=0x0, hdr_size=2596, hdr_vaddr=71788,
      ehdr=0x7fffffffd390, eh_frame_vaddr=
      0x7fffffffd378, table_entries=0x8808d8, table_encoding=0x8808e0 "") at
      dwarf_getcfi_elf.c:79
  #1  0x000000385f81615a in getcfi_scn_eh_frame (hdr_vaddr=71788,
      hdr_scn=0x8839b0, shdr=0x7fffffffd2f0, scn=<optimized out>,
      ehdr=0x7fffffffd390, elf=0x882b30) at dwarf_getcfi_elf.c:231
  #2  getcfi_shdr (ehdr=0x7fffffffd390, elf=0x882b30) at dwarf_getcfi_elf.c:283
  #3  dwarf_getcfi_elf (elf=0x882b30) at dwarf_getcfi_elf.c:309
  #4  0x00000000004d5bac in debuginfo__find_probes (pf=0x7fffffffd4f0,
      dbg=Unhandled dwarf expression opcode 0xfa) at util/probe-finder.c:993
  #5  0x00000000004d634a in debuginfo__find_trace_events (dbg=0x880840,
      pev=<optimized out>, tevs=0x880f88, max_tevs=<optimized out>) at
      util/probe-finder.c:1200
  #6  0x00000000004aed6b in try_to_find_probe_trace_events (target=0x881b20
      "/lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so",
      max_tevs=128, tevs=0x880f88, pev=0x859b30) at util/probe-event.c:482
  #7  convert_to_probe_trace_events (target=0x881b20
      "/lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so", max_tevs=128, tevs=0x880f88,
      pev=0x859b30) at util/probe-event.c:2356
  #8  add_perf_probe_events (pevs=<optimized out>, npevs=1, max_tevs=128,
      target=0x881b20 "/lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so", force_add=false) at
      util/probe-event.c:2391
  #9  0x000000000044014f in __cmd_probe (argc=<optimized out>,
      argv=0x7fffffffe2f0, prefix=Unhandled dwarf expression opcode 0xfa) at
      at builtin-probe.c:488
  #10 0x0000000000440313 in cmd_probe (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffe2f0,
      prefix=<optimized out>) at builtin-probe.c:506
  #11 0x000000000041d133 in run_builtin (p=0x805680, argc=5,
      argv=0x7fffffffe2f0) at perf.c:341
  #12 0x000000000041c8b2 in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>,
      argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:400
  #13 run_argv (argv=<optimized out>, argcp=<optimized out>) at perf.c:444
  #14 main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffe2f0) at perf.c:559

And I found a related commit (5704c8c4fa71 "getcfi_scn_eh_frame: Don't
crash and burn when .eh_frame bits aren't there.") in elfutils that can
lead to a unexpected crash like this.  To safely use the function, it
needs to check the .eh_frame section is a PROGBITS type.

Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Wielaard <mjw@redhat.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141230090533.GH6081@sejong
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 28, 2015
It is possible for ata_sff_flush_pio_task() to set ap->hsm_task_state to
HSM_ST_IDLE in between the time __ata_sff_port_intr() checks for HSM_ST_IDLE
and before it calls ata_sff_hsm_move() causing ata_sff_hsm_move() to BUG().

This problem is hard to reproduce making this patch hard to verify, but this
fix will prevent the race.

I have not been able to reproduce the problem, but here is a crash dump from
a 2.6.32 kernel.

On examining the ata port's state, its hsm_task_state field has a value of HSM_ST_IDLE:

crash> struct ata_port.hsm_task_state ffff881c1121c000
  hsm_task_state = 0

Normally, this should not be possible as ata_sff_hsm_move() was called from ata_sff_host_intr(),
which checks hsm_task_state and won't call ata_sff_hsm_move() if it has a HSM_ST_IDLE value.

PID: 11053  TASK: ffff8816e846cae0  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "sshd"
 #0 [ffff88008ba03960] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b
 #1 [ffff88008ba039c0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92
 #2 [ffff88008ba03a90] oops_end at ffffffff8152b510
 #3 [ffff88008ba03ac0] die at ffffffff81010e0b
 #4 [ffff88008ba03af0] do_trap at ffffffff8152ad74
 #5 [ffff88008ba03b50] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95
 #6 [ffff88008ba03bf0] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b
    [exception RIP: ata_sff_hsm_move+317]
    RIP: ffffffff813a77ad  RSP: ffff88008ba03ca0  RFLAGS: 00010097
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff881c1121dc60  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: ffff881c1121dd10  RSI: ffff881c1121dc60  RDI: ffff881c1121c000
    RBP: ffff88008ba03d00   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 000000000000002e
    R10: 000000000001003f  R11: 000000000000009b  R12: ffff881c1121c000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000050  R15: ffff881c1121dd78
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff88008ba03d08] ata_sff_host_intr at ffffffff813a7fbd
 #8 [ffff88008ba03d38] ata_sff_interrupt at ffffffff813a821e
 #9 [ffff88008ba03d78] handle_IRQ_event at ffffffff810e6ec0
--- <IRQ stack> ---
    [exception RIP: pipe_poll+48]
    RIP: ffffffff81192780  RSP: ffff880f26d459b8  RFLAGS: 00000246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff880f26d459c8  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: ffff881a0539fa80
    RBP: ffffffff8100bb8e   R8: ffff8803b23324a0   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: ffff880f26d45dd0  R11: 0000000000000008  R12: ffffffff8109b646
    R13: ffff880f26d45948  R14: 0000000000000246  R15: 0000000000000246
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    RIP: 00007f26017435c3  RSP: 00007fffe020c420  RFLAGS: 00000206
    RAX: 0000000000000017  RBX: ffffffff8100b072  RCX: 00007fffe020c45c
    RDX: 00007f2604a3f120  RSI: 00007f2604a3f140  RDI: 000000000000000d
    RBP: 0000000000000000   R8: 00007fffe020e570   R9: 0101010101010101
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: 00007fffe020e5f0
    R13: 00007fffe020e5f4  R14: 00007f26045f373c  R15: 00007fffe020e5e0
    ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000017  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

Somewhere between the ata_sff_hsm_move() check and the ata_sff_host_intr() check, the value changed.
On examining the other cpus to see what else was running, another cpu was running the error handler
routines:

PID: 326    TASK: ffff881c11014aa0  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "scsi_eh_1"
 #0 [ffff88008ba27e90] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff8102fee6
 #1 [ffff88008ba27ea0] notifier_call_chain at ffffffff8152d515
 #2 [ffff88008ba27ee0] atomic_notifier_call_chain at ffffffff8152d57a
 #3 [ffff88008ba27ef0] notify_die at ffffffff810a154e
 #4 [ffff88008ba27f20] do_nmi at ffffffff8152b1db
 #5 [ffff88008ba27f50] nmi at ffffffff8152aaa0
    [exception RIP: _spin_lock_irqsave+47]
    RIP: ffffffff8152a1ff  RSP: ffff881c11a73aa0  RFLAGS: 00000006
    RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: ffff881c1121deb8  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000246  RSI: 0000000000000020  RDI: ffff881c122612d8
    RBP: ffff881c11a73aa0   R8: ffff881c17083800   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff881c1121c000
    R13: 000000000000001f  R14: ffff881c1121dd50  R15: ffff881c1121dc60
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
--- <NMI exception stack> ---
 #6 [ffff881c11a73aa0] _spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff8152a1ff
 #7 [ffff881c11a73aa8] ata_exec_internal_sg at ffffffff81396fb5
 #8 [ffff881c11a73b58] ata_exec_internal at ffffffff81397109
 #9 [ffff881c11a73bd8] atapi_eh_request_sense at ffffffff813a34eb

Before it tried to acquire a spinlock, ata_exec_internal_sg() called ata_sff_flush_pio_task().
This function will set ap->hsm_task_state to HSM_ST_IDLE, and has no locking around setting this
value. ata_sff_flush_pio_task() can then race with the interrupt handler and potentially set
HSM_ST_IDLE at a fatal moment, which will trigger a kernel BUG.

v2: Fixup comment in ata_sff_flush_pio_task()

tj: Further updated comment.  Use ap->lock instead of shost lock and
    use the [un]lock_irq variant instead of the irqsave/restore one.

Signed-off-by: David Milburn <dmilburn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 2, 2015
Once the current message is finished, the driver notifies SPI core about
this by calling spi_finalize_current_message(). This function queues next
message to be transferred. If there are more messages in the queue, it is
possible that the driver is asked to transfer the next message at this
point.

When spi_finalize_current_message() returns the driver clears the
drv_data->cur_chip pointer to NULL. The problem is that if the driver
already started the next message clearing drv_data->cur_chip will cause
NULL pointer dereference which crashes the kernel like:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048
 IP: [<ffffffffa0022bc8>] cs_deassert+0x18/0x70 [spi_pxa2xx_platform]
 PGD 78bb8067 PUD 37712067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Tainted: G           O   3.18.0-rc4-mjo #5
 Hardware name: Intel Corp. VALLEYVIEW B3 PLATFORM/NOTEBOOK, BIOS MNW2CRB1.X64.0071.R30.1408131301 08/13/2014
 task: ffff880077f9f290 ti: ffff88007a820000 task.ti: ffff88007a820000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0022bc8>]  [<ffffffffa0022bc8>] cs_deassert+0x18/0x70 [spi_pxa2xx_platform]
 RSP: 0018:ffff88007a823d08  EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8800379a4430 RCX: 0000000000000026
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff8800379a4430
 RBP: ffff88007a823d18 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 000000007a9bc65a
 R10: 000000000000028f R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff880070123e98
 R13: ffff880070123de8 R14: 0000000000000100 R15: ffffc90004888000
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880079a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
 CR2: 0000000000000048 CR3: 000000007029b000 CR4: 00000000001007e0
 Stack:
  ffff88007a823d58 ffff8800379a4430 ffff88007a823d48 ffffffffa0022c89
  0000000000000000 ffff8800379a4430 0000000000000000 0000000000000006
  ffff88007a823da8 ffffffffa0023be0 ffff88007a823dd8 ffffffff81076204
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffffa0022c89>] giveback+0x69/0xa0 [spi_pxa2xx_platform]
  [<ffffffffa0023be0>] pump_transfers+0x710/0x740 [spi_pxa2xx_platform]
  [<ffffffff81076204>] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x744/0x830
  [<ffffffff81049679>] tasklet_action+0xa9/0xe0
  [<ffffffff81049a0e>] __do_softirq+0xee/0x280
  [<ffffffff81049bc0>] run_ksoftirqd+0x20/0x40
  [<ffffffff810646df>] smpboot_thread_fn+0xff/0x1b0
  [<ffffffff810645e0>] ? SyS_setgroups+0x150/0x150
  [<ffffffff81060f9d>] kthread+0xcd/0xf0
  [<ffffffff81060ed0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
  [<ffffffff8187a82c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0

Fix this by clearing drv_data->cur_chip before we call spi_finalize_current_message().

Reported-by: Martin Oldfield <m@mjoldfield.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 9, 2015
commit ce75145 upstream.

It is possible for ata_sff_flush_pio_task() to set ap->hsm_task_state to
HSM_ST_IDLE in between the time __ata_sff_port_intr() checks for HSM_ST_IDLE
and before it calls ata_sff_hsm_move() causing ata_sff_hsm_move() to BUG().

This problem is hard to reproduce making this patch hard to verify, but this
fix will prevent the race.

I have not been able to reproduce the problem, but here is a crash dump from
a 2.6.32 kernel.

On examining the ata port's state, its hsm_task_state field has a value of HSM_ST_IDLE:

crash> struct ata_port.hsm_task_state ffff881c1121c000
  hsm_task_state = 0

Normally, this should not be possible as ata_sff_hsm_move() was called from ata_sff_host_intr(),
which checks hsm_task_state and won't call ata_sff_hsm_move() if it has a HSM_ST_IDLE value.

PID: 11053  TASK: ffff8816e846cae0  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "sshd"
 #0 [ffff88008ba03960] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b
 #1 [ffff88008ba039c0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92
 #2 [ffff88008ba03a90] oops_end at ffffffff8152b510
 #3 [ffff88008ba03ac0] die at ffffffff81010e0b
 #4 [ffff88008ba03af0] do_trap at ffffffff8152ad74
 #5 [ffff88008ba03b50] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95
 #6 [ffff88008ba03bf0] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b
    [exception RIP: ata_sff_hsm_move+317]
    RIP: ffffffff813a77ad  RSP: ffff88008ba03ca0  RFLAGS: 00010097
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff881c1121dc60  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: ffff881c1121dd10  RSI: ffff881c1121dc60  RDI: ffff881c1121c000
    RBP: ffff88008ba03d00   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 000000000000002e
    R10: 000000000001003f  R11: 000000000000009b  R12: ffff881c1121c000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000050  R15: ffff881c1121dd78
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff88008ba03d08] ata_sff_host_intr at ffffffff813a7fbd
 #8 [ffff88008ba03d38] ata_sff_interrupt at ffffffff813a821e
 #9 [ffff88008ba03d78] handle_IRQ_event at ffffffff810e6ec0
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 9, 2015
commit c957e8f upstream.

Once the current message is finished, the driver notifies SPI core about
this by calling spi_finalize_current_message(). This function queues next
message to be transferred. If there are more messages in the queue, it is
possible that the driver is asked to transfer the next message at this
point.

When spi_finalize_current_message() returns the driver clears the
drv_data->cur_chip pointer to NULL. The problem is that if the driver
already started the next message clearing drv_data->cur_chip will cause
NULL pointer dereference which crashes the kernel like:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048
 IP: [<ffffffffa0022bc8>] cs_deassert+0x18/0x70 [spi_pxa2xx_platform]
 PGD 78bb8067 PUD 37712067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Tainted: G           O   3.18.0-rc4-mjo #5
 Hardware name: Intel Corp. VALLEYVIEW B3 PLATFORM/NOTEBOOK, BIOS MNW2CRB1.X64.0071.R30.1408131301 08/13/2014
 task: ffff880077f9f290 ti: ffff88007a820000 task.ti: ffff88007a820000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0022bc8>]  [<ffffffffa0022bc8>] cs_deassert+0x18/0x70 [spi_pxa2xx_platform]
 RSP: 0018:ffff88007a823d08  EFLAGS: 00010202
 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8800379a4430 RCX: 0000000000000026
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff8800379a4430
 RBP: ffff88007a823d18 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 000000007a9bc65a
 R10: 000000000000028f R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff880070123e98
 R13: ffff880070123de8 R14: 0000000000000100 R15: ffffc90004888000
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880079a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
 CR2: 0000000000000048 CR3: 000000007029b000 CR4: 00000000001007e0
 Stack:
  ffff88007a823d58 ffff8800379a4430 ffff88007a823d48 ffffffffa0022c89
  0000000000000000 ffff8800379a4430 0000000000000000 0000000000000006
  ffff88007a823da8 ffffffffa0023be0 ffff88007a823dd8 ffffffff81076204
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffffa0022c89>] giveback+0x69/0xa0 [spi_pxa2xx_platform]
  [<ffffffffa0023be0>] pump_transfers+0x710/0x740 [spi_pxa2xx_platform]
  [<ffffffff81076204>] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x744/0x830
  [<ffffffff81049679>] tasklet_action+0xa9/0xe0
  [<ffffffff81049a0e>] __do_softirq+0xee/0x280
  [<ffffffff81049bc0>] run_ksoftirqd+0x20/0x40
  [<ffffffff810646df>] smpboot_thread_fn+0xff/0x1b0
  [<ffffffff810645e0>] ? SyS_setgroups+0x150/0x150
  [<ffffffff81060f9d>] kthread+0xcd/0xf0
  [<ffffffff81060ed0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x180/0x180
  [<ffffffff8187a82c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0

Fix this by clearing drv_data->cur_chip before we call spi_finalize_current_message().

Reported-by: Martin Oldfield <m@mjoldfield.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 9, 2015
commit 045c47c upstream.

When reading blkio.throttle.io_serviced in a recently created blkio
cgroup, it's possible to race against the creation of a throttle policy,
which delays the allocation of stats_cpu.

Like other functions in the throttle code, just checking for a NULL
stats_cpu prevents the following oops caused by that race.

[ 1117.285199] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x7fb4d0020
[ 1117.285252] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000003efa2c
[ 1137.733921] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[ 1137.733945] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
[ 1137.734025] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc kvm_hv kvm binfmt_misc autofs4
[ 1137.734102] CPU: 3 PID: 5302 Comm: blkcgroup Not tainted 3.19.0 #5
[ 1137.734132] task: c000000f1d188b00 ti: c000000f1d210000 task.ti: c000000f1d210000
[ 1137.734167] NIP: c0000000003efa2c LR: c0000000003ef9f0 CTR: c0000000003ef980
[ 1137.734202] REGS: c000000f1d213500 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (3.19.0)
[ 1137.734230] MSR: 9000000000009032 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 42008884  XER: 20000000
[ 1137.734325] CFAR: 0000000000008458 DAR: 00000007fb4d0020 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 0
GPR00: c0000000003ed3a0 c000000f1d213780 c000000000c59538 0000000000000000
GPR04: 0000000000000800 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR08: ffffffffffffffff 00000007fb4d0020 00000007fb4d0000 c000000000780808
GPR12: 0000000022000888 c00000000fdc0d80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 000001003e120200 c000000f1d5b0cc0 0000000000000200 0000000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000001 c000000000c269e0 0000000000000020 c000000f1d5b0c80
GPR28: c000000000ca3a08 c000000000ca3dec c000000f1c667e00 c000000f1d213850
[ 1137.734886] NIP [c0000000003efa2c] .tg_prfill_cpu_rwstat+0xac/0x180
[ 1137.734915] LR [c0000000003ef9f0] .tg_prfill_cpu_rwstat+0x70/0x180
[ 1137.734943] Call Trace:
[ 1137.734952] [c000000f1d213780] [d000000005560520] 0xd000000005560520 (unreliable)
[ 1137.734996] [c000000f1d2138a0] [c0000000003ed3a0] .blkcg_print_blkgs+0xe0/0x1a0
[ 1137.735039] [c000000f1d213960] [c0000000003efb50] .tg_print_cpu_rwstat+0x50/0x70
[ 1137.735082] [c000000f1d2139e0] [c000000000104b48] .cgroup_seqfile_show+0x58/0x150
[ 1137.735125] [c000000f1d213a70] [c0000000002749dc] .kernfs_seq_show+0x3c/0x50
[ 1137.735161] [c000000f1d213ae0] [c000000000218630] .seq_read+0xe0/0x510
[ 1137.735197] [c000000f1d213bd0] [c000000000275b04] .kernfs_fop_read+0x164/0x200
[ 1137.735240] [c000000f1d213c80] [c0000000001eb8e0] .__vfs_read+0x30/0x80
[ 1137.735276] [c000000f1d213cf0] [c0000000001eb9c4] .vfs_read+0x94/0x1b0
[ 1137.735312] [c000000f1d213d90] [c0000000001ebb38] .SyS_read+0x58/0x100
[ 1137.735349] [c000000f1d213e30] [c000000000009218] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98
[ 1137.735383] Instruction dump:
[ 1137.735405] 7c6307b4 7f891800 409d00b8 60000000 60420000 3d420004 392a63b0 786a1f24
[ 1137.735471] 7d49502a e93e01c8 7d495214 7d2ad214 <7cead02a> e9090008 e9490010 e9290018

And here is one code that allows to easily reproduce this, although this
has first been found by running docker.

void run(pid_t pid)
{
	int n;
	int status;
	int fd;
	char *buffer;
	buffer = memalign(BUFFER_ALIGN, BUFFER_SIZE);
	n = snprintf(buffer, BUFFER_SIZE, "%d\n", pid);
	fd = open(CGPATH "/test/tasks", O_WRONLY);
	write(fd, buffer, n);
	close(fd);
	if (fork() > 0) {
		fd = open("/dev/sda", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
		read(fd, buffer, 512);
		close(fd);
		wait(&status);
	} else {
		fd = open(CGPATH "/test/blkio.throttle.io_serviced", O_RDONLY);
		n = read(fd, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE);
		close(fd);
	}
	free(buffer);
	exit(0);
}

void test(void)
{
	int status;
	mkdir(CGPATH "/test", 0666);
	if (fork() > 0)
		wait(&status);
	else
		run(getpid());
	rmdir(CGPATH "/test");
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < NR_TESTS; i++)
		test();
	return 0;
}

Reported-by: Ricardo Marin Matinata <rmm@br.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 9, 2015
commit 045c47c upstream.

When reading blkio.throttle.io_serviced in a recently created blkio
cgroup, it's possible to race against the creation of a throttle policy,
which delays the allocation of stats_cpu.

Like other functions in the throttle code, just checking for a NULL
stats_cpu prevents the following oops caused by that race.

[ 1117.285199] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x7fb4d0020
[ 1117.285252] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000003efa2c
[ 1137.733921] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[ 1137.733945] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
[ 1137.734025] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc kvm_hv kvm binfmt_misc autofs4
[ 1137.734102] CPU: 3 PID: 5302 Comm: blkcgroup Not tainted 3.19.0 #5
[ 1137.734132] task: c000000f1d188b00 ti: c000000f1d210000 task.ti: c000000f1d210000
[ 1137.734167] NIP: c0000000003efa2c LR: c0000000003ef9f0 CTR: c0000000003ef980
[ 1137.734202] REGS: c000000f1d213500 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (3.19.0)
[ 1137.734230] MSR: 9000000000009032 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 42008884  XER: 20000000
[ 1137.734325] CFAR: 0000000000008458 DAR: 00000007fb4d0020 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 0
GPR00: c0000000003ed3a0 c000000f1d213780 c000000000c59538 0000000000000000
GPR04: 0000000000000800 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR08: ffffffffffffffff 00000007fb4d0020 00000007fb4d0000 c000000000780808
GPR12: 0000000022000888 c00000000fdc0d80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 000001003e120200 c000000f1d5b0cc0 0000000000000200 0000000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000001 c000000000c269e0 0000000000000020 c000000f1d5b0c80
GPR28: c000000000ca3a08 c000000000ca3dec c000000f1c667e00 c000000f1d213850
[ 1137.734886] NIP [c0000000003efa2c] .tg_prfill_cpu_rwstat+0xac/0x180
[ 1137.734915] LR [c0000000003ef9f0] .tg_prfill_cpu_rwstat+0x70/0x180
[ 1137.734943] Call Trace:
[ 1137.734952] [c000000f1d213780] [d000000005560520] 0xd000000005560520 (unreliable)
[ 1137.734996] [c000000f1d2138a0] [c0000000003ed3a0] .blkcg_print_blkgs+0xe0/0x1a0
[ 1137.735039] [c000000f1d213960] [c0000000003efb50] .tg_print_cpu_rwstat+0x50/0x70
[ 1137.735082] [c000000f1d2139e0] [c000000000104b48] .cgroup_seqfile_show+0x58/0x150
[ 1137.735125] [c000000f1d213a70] [c0000000002749dc] .kernfs_seq_show+0x3c/0x50
[ 1137.735161] [c000000f1d213ae0] [c000000000218630] .seq_read+0xe0/0x510
[ 1137.735197] [c000000f1d213bd0] [c000000000275b04] .kernfs_fop_read+0x164/0x200
[ 1137.735240] [c000000f1d213c80] [c0000000001eb8e0] .__vfs_read+0x30/0x80
[ 1137.735276] [c000000f1d213cf0] [c0000000001eb9c4] .vfs_read+0x94/0x1b0
[ 1137.735312] [c000000f1d213d90] [c0000000001ebb38] .SyS_read+0x58/0x100
[ 1137.735349] [c000000f1d213e30] [c000000000009218] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98
[ 1137.735383] Instruction dump:
[ 1137.735405] 7c6307b4 7f891800 409d00b8 60000000 60420000 3d420004 392a63b0 786a1f24
[ 1137.735471] 7d49502a e93e01c8 7d495214 7d2ad214 <7cead02a> e9090008 e9490010 e9290018

And here is one code that allows to easily reproduce this, although this
has first been found by running docker.

void run(pid_t pid)
{
	int n;
	int status;
	int fd;
	char *buffer;
	buffer = memalign(BUFFER_ALIGN, BUFFER_SIZE);
	n = snprintf(buffer, BUFFER_SIZE, "%d\n", pid);
	fd = open(CGPATH "/test/tasks", O_WRONLY);
	write(fd, buffer, n);
	close(fd);
	if (fork() > 0) {
		fd = open("/dev/sda", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
		read(fd, buffer, 512);
		close(fd);
		wait(&status);
	} else {
		fd = open(CGPATH "/test/blkio.throttle.io_serviced", O_RDONLY);
		n = read(fd, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE);
		close(fd);
	}
	free(buffer);
	exit(0);
}

void test(void)
{
	int status;
	mkdir(CGPATH "/test", 0666);
	if (fork() > 0)
		wait(&status);
	else
		run(getpid());
	rmdir(CGPATH "/test");
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int i;
	for (i = 0; i < NR_TESTS; i++)
		test();
	return 0;
}

Reported-by: Ricardo Marin Matinata <rmm@br.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2015
Perf top raise a warning if a kernel sample is collected but kernel map
is restricted. The warning message needs to dereference al.map->dso...

However, previous perf_event__preprocess_sample() doesn't always
guarantee al.map != NULL, for example, when kernel map is restricted.

This patch validates al.map before dereferencing, avoid the segfault.

Before this patch:

 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
 1
 $ perf top -p  120183
 perf: Segmentation fault
 -------- backtrace --------
 /path/to/perf[0x509868]
 /lib64/libc.so.6(+0x3545f)[0x7f9a1540045f]
 /path/to/perf[0x448820]
 /path/to/perf(cmd_top+0xe3c)[0x44a5dc]
 /path/to/perf[0x4766a2]
 /path/to/perf(main+0x5f5)[0x42e545]
 /lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf4)[0x7f9a153ecbd4]
 /path/to/perf[0x42e674]

And gdb call trace:

 Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
 perf_event__process_sample (machine=0xa44030, sample=0x7fffffffa4c0, evsel=0xa43b00, event=0x7ffff41c3000, tool=0x7fffffffa8a0)
    at builtin-top.c:736
 736				  !RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&al.map->dso->symbols[MAP__FUNCTION]) ?
 (gdb) bt
 #0  perf_event__process_sample (machine=0xa44030, sample=0x7fffffffa4c0, evsel=0xa43b00, event=0x7ffff41c3000, tool=0x7fffffffa8a0)
     at builtin-top.c:736
 #1  perf_top__mmap_read_idx (top=top@entry=0x7fffffffa8a0, idx=idx@entry=0) at builtin-top.c:855
 #2  0x000000000044a5dd in perf_top__mmap_read (top=0x7fffffffa8a0) at builtin-top.c:872
 #3  __cmd_top (top=0x7fffffffa8a0) at builtin-top.c:997
 #4  cmd_top (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, prefix=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1267
 #5  0x00000000004766a3 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0x8a6ce8 <commands+264>, argc=argc@entry=3, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffdf70)
      at perf.c:371
 #6  0x000000000042e546 in handle_internal_command (argv=0x7fffffffdf70, argc=3) at perf.c:430
 #7  run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffdcf0, argcp=0x7fffffffdcfc) at perf.c:474
 #8  main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffdf70) at perf.c:589
 (gdb)

Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1429946703-80807-1-git-send-email-wangnan0@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2015
…d when deactivating swap

Jeff Layton reported the following;

 [   74.232485] ------------[ cut here ]------------
 [   74.233354] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 754 at net/core/sock.c:364 sk_clear_memalloc+0x51/0x80()
 [   74.234790] Modules linked in: cts rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache xfs libcrc32c snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_controller snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device nfsd snd_pcm snd_timer snd e1000 ppdev parport_pc joydev parport pvpanic soundcore floppy serio_raw i2c_piix4 pcspkr nfs_acl lockd virtio_balloon acpi_cpufreq auth_rpcgss grace sunrpc qxl drm_kms_helper ttm drm virtio_console virtio_blk virtio_pci ata_generic virtio_ring pata_acpi virtio
 [   74.243599] CPU: 2 PID: 754 Comm: swapoff Not tainted 4.1.0-rc6+ #5
 [   74.244635] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 [   74.245546]  0000000000000000 0000000079e69e31 ffff8800d066bde8 ffffffff8179263d
 [   74.246786]  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800d066be28 ffffffff8109e6fa
 [   74.248175]  0000000000000000 ffff880118d48000 ffff8800d58f5c08 ffff880036e380a8
 [   74.249483] Call Trace:
 [   74.249872]  [<ffffffff8179263d>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
 [   74.250703]  [<ffffffff8109e6fa>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8a/0xc0
 [   74.251655]  [<ffffffff8109e82a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
 [   74.252585]  [<ffffffff81661241>] sk_clear_memalloc+0x51/0x80
 [   74.253519]  [<ffffffffa0116c72>] xs_disable_swap+0x42/0x80 [sunrpc]
 [   74.254537]  [<ffffffffa01109de>] rpc_clnt_swap_deactivate+0x7e/0xc0 [sunrpc]
 [   74.255610]  [<ffffffffa03e4fd7>] nfs_swap_deactivate+0x27/0x30 [nfs]
 [   74.256582]  [<ffffffff811e99d4>] destroy_swap_extents+0x74/0x80
 [   74.257496]  [<ffffffff811ecb52>] SyS_swapoff+0x222/0x5c0
 [   74.258318]  [<ffffffff81023f27>] ? syscall_trace_leave+0xc7/0x140
 [   74.259253]  [<ffffffff81798dae>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
 [   74.260158] ---[ end trace 2530722966429f10 ]---

The warning in question was unnecessary but with Jeff's series the rules
are also clearer.  This patch removes the warning and updates the comment
to explain why sk_mem_reclaim() may still be called.

[jlayton: remove if (sk->sk_forward_alloc) conditional. As Leon
          points out that it's not needed.]

Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@leon.nu>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2015
Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the
following backtrace:

PID: 18308  TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "rsync"
  #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152
  #1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e
  #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5
  #3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a
  #4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6
  #5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5
  #6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f
  #7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445
  #8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845
  #9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead
 #10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3
 #11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff
 #12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f
 #13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be
 #14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423
 #15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5
 #16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d
 #17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618
 #18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b
 #19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297
 #20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6
 #21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1
 #22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c
 #23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8
 #24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09
 #25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848
 #26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7
 #27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa
 #28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b
 #29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5
 #30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490
 #31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199
 #32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c
 #33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1
 #34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91
 #35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32
 #36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5
 #37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc
 #38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e
 #39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e
 #40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89

Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the
reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by
PG_writeback right away.

The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM
with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs
was specified.  The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg:
further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the
__GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs
code.  But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't
necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away.

ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily
submit the bio.  Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and
mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up
waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted
yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes.

Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2)
before we go to wait on the writeback.  The page fault path, which is
the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't
require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM
killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic.

As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already
so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem.  Moreover he notes:

: For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion
: which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The
: writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten
: extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on
: page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not
: safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+
[tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow]
Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages")
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2015
It turns out that a PV domU also requires the "Xen PV" APIC
driver. Otherwise, the flat driver is used and we get stuck in busy
loops that never exit, such as in this stack trace:

(gdb) target remote localhost:9999
Remote debugging using localhost:9999
__xapic_wait_icr_idle () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/ipi.h:56
56              while (native_apic_mem_read(APIC_ICR) & APIC_ICR_BUSY)
(gdb) bt
 #0  __xapic_wait_icr_idle () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/ipi.h:56
 #1  __default_send_IPI_shortcut (shortcut=<optimized out>,
dest=<optimized out>, vector=<optimized out>) at
./arch/x86/include/asm/ipi.h:75
 #2  apic_send_IPI_self (vector=246) at arch/x86/kernel/apic/probe_64.c:54
 #3  0xffffffff81011336 in arch_irq_work_raise () at
arch/x86/kernel/irq_work.c:47
 #4  0xffffffff8114990c in irq_work_queue (work=0xffff88000fc0e400) at
kernel/irq_work.c:100
 #5  0xffffffff8110c29d in wake_up_klogd () at kernel/printk/printk.c:2633
 #6  0xffffffff8110ca60 in vprintk_emit (facility=0, level=<optimized
out>, dict=0x0 <irq_stack_union>, dictlen=<optimized out>,
fmt=<optimized out>, args=<optimized out>)
    at kernel/printk/printk.c:1778
 #7  0xffffffff816010c8 in printk (fmt=<optimized out>) at
kernel/printk/printk.c:1868
 #8  0xffffffffc00013ea in ?? ()
 #9  0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()

Mailing-list-thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/8/4/755
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2015
A recent change to the cpu_cooling code introduced a AB-BA deadlock
scenario between the cpufreq_policy_notifier_list rwsem and the
cooling_cpufreq_lock.  This is caused by cooling_cpufreq_lock being held
before the registration/removal of the notifier block (an operation
which takes the rwsem), and the notifier code itself which takes the
locks in the reverse order:

======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.18.0+ #1453 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
rc.local/770 is trying to acquire lock:
 (cooling_cpufreq_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04abfc4>] cpufreq_thermal_notifier+0x34/0xfc

but task is already holding lock:
 ((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<c0042f04>]  __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x68

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 ((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}:
       [<c06bc3b0>] down_write+0x44/0x9c
       [<c0043444>] blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x28/0xd8
       [<c04ad610>] cpufreq_register_notifier+0x68/0x90
       [<c04abe4c>] __cpufreq_cooling_register.part.1+0x120/0x180
       [<c04abf44>] __cpufreq_cooling_register+0x98/0xa4
       [<c04abf8c>] cpufreq_cooling_register+0x18/0x1c
       [<bf0046f8>] imx_thermal_probe+0x1c0/0x470 [imx_thermal]
       [<c037cef8>] platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xac
       [<c037b710>] driver_probe_device+0x114/0x234
       [<c037b8cc>] __driver_attach+0x9c/0xa0
       [<c0379d68>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x90
       [<c037b204>] driver_attach+0x24/0x28
       [<c037ae7c>] bus_add_driver+0xe0/0x1d8
       [<c037c0cc>] driver_register+0x80/0xfc
       [<c037cd80>] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x64
       [<bf007018>] 0xbf007018
       [<c0008a5c>] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x1d8
       [<c0095da4>] load_module+0x1768/0x1ef8
       [<c0096614>] SyS_init_module+0xe0/0xf4
       [<c000ec00>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48

-> #0 (cooling_cpufreq_lock){+.+.+.}:
       [<c00619f8>] lock_acquire+0xb0/0x124
       [<c06ba3b4>] mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x3d8
       [<c04abfc4>] cpufreq_thermal_notifier+0x34/0xfc
       [<c0042bf4>] notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c
       [<c0042f20>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68
       [<c0042f58>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28
       [<c04ae62c>] cpufreq_set_policy+0x7c/0x1d0
       [<c04af3cc>] store_scaling_governor+0x74/0x9c
       [<c04ad418>] store+0x90/0xc0
       [<c0175384>] sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x58
       [<c01746b4>] kernfs_fop_write+0xdc/0x190
       [<c010dcc0>] vfs_write+0xac/0x1b4
       [<c010dfec>] SyS_write+0x44/0x90
       [<c000ec00>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem);
                               lock(cooling_cpufreq_lock);
                               lock((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem);
  lock(cooling_cpufreq_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

7 locks held by rc.local/770:
 #0:  (sb_writers#6){.+.+.+}, at: [<c010dda0>] vfs_write+0x18c/0x1b4
 #1:  (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0174678>] kernfs_fop_write+0xa0/0x190
 #2:  (s_active#52){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0174680>] kernfs_fop_write+0xa8/0x190
 #3:  (cpu_hotplug.lock){++++++}, at: [<c0026a60>] get_online_cpus+0x34/0x90
 #4:  (cpufreq_rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<c04ad3e0>] store+0x58/0xc0
 #5:  (&policy->rwsem){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04ad3f8>] store+0x70/0xc0
 #6:  ((cpufreq_policy_notifier_list).rwsem){++++.+}, at: [<c0042f04>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x34/0x68

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 770 Comm: rc.local Not tainted 3.18.0+ #1453
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[<c00121c8>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c0012360>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c)
 r6:c0b85a80 r5:c0b75630 r4:00000000 r3:00000000
[<c0012348>] (show_stack) from [<c06b6c48>] (dump_stack+0x7c/0x98)
[<c06b6bcc>] (dump_stack) from [<c06b42a4>] (print_circular_bug+0x28c/0x2d8)
 r4:c0b85a80 r3:d0071d40
[<c06b4018>] (print_circular_bug) from [<c00613b0>] (__lock_acquire+0x1acc/0x1bb0)
 r10:c0b50660 r8:c09e6d80 r7:d0071d40 r6:c11d0f0c r5:00000007 r4:d0072240
[<c005f8e4>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c00619f8>] (lock_acquire+0xb0/0x124)
 r10:00000000 r9:c04abfc4 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:c0a06f0c
 r4:00000000
[<c0061948>] (lock_acquire) from [<c06ba3b4>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x5c/0x3d8)
 r10:ec853800 r9:c0a06ed4 r8:d0071d40 r7:c0a06ed4 r6:c11d0f0c r5:00000000
 r4:c04abfc4
[<c06ba358>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c04abfc4>] (cpufreq_thermal_notifier+0x34/0xfc)
 r10:ec853800 r9:ec85380c r8:d00d7d3c r7:c0a06ed4 r6:d00d7d3c r5:00000000
 r4:fffffffe
[<c04abf90>] (cpufreq_thermal_notifier) from [<c0042bf4>] (notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x8c)
 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:00000000 r4:fffffffe
[<c0042ba8>] (notifier_call_chain) from [<c0042f20>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x68)
 r8:c0a072a4 r7:00000000 r6:d00d7d3c r5:ffffffff r4:c0a06fc8 r3:ffffffff
[<c0042ed0>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain) from [<c0042f58>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0x28)
 r7:ec98b540 r6:c13ebc80 r5:ed76e600 r4:d00d7d3c
[<c0042f38>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain) from [<c04ae62c>] (cpufreq_set_policy+0x7c/0x1d0)
[<c04ae5b0>] (cpufreq_set_policy) from [<c04af3cc>] (store_scaling_governor+0x74/0x9c)
 r7:ec98b540 r6:0000000c r5:ec98b540 r4:ed76e600
[<c04af358>] (store_scaling_governor) from [<c04ad418>] (store+0x90/0xc0)
 r6:0000000c r5:ed76e6d4 r4:ed76e600
[<c04ad388>] (store) from [<c0175384>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x58)
 r8:0000000c r7:d00d7f78 r6:ec98b540 r5:0000000c r4:ec853800 r3:0000000c
[<c0175330>] (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c01746b4>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xdc/0x190)
 r6:ec98b540 r5:00000000 r4:00000000 r3:c0175330
[<c01745d8>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c010dcc0>] (vfs_write+0xac/0x1b4)
 r10:0162aa70 r9:d00d6000 r8:0000000c r7:d00d7f78 r6:0162aa70 r5:0000000c
 r4:eccde500
[<c010dc14>] (vfs_write) from [<c010dfec>] (SyS_write+0x44/0x90)
 r10:0162aa70 r8:0000000c r7:eccde500 r6:eccde500 r5:00000000 r4:00000000
[<c010dfa8>] (SyS_write) from [<c000ec00>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
 r10:00000000 r8:c000edc4 r7:00000004 r6:000216cc r5:0000000c r4:0162aa70

Solve this by moving to finer grained locking - use one mutex to protect
the cpufreq_dev_list as a whole, and a separate lock to ensure correct
ordering of cpufreq notifier registration and removal.

cooling_list_lock is taken within cooling_cpufreq_lock on
(un)registration to preserve the behavior of the code, i.e. to
atomically add/remove to the list and (un)register the notifier.

Fixes: 2dcd851 ("thermal: cpu_cooling: Update always cpufreq policy with
Reviewed-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 17, 2015
PID: 614    TASK: ffff882a739da580  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "ocfs2dc"
  #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d
  #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5
  #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8
  #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b
  #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0
  #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5
  #6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb
     [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208]
     RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940  RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0  RFLAGS: 00010002
     RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 000000000000654b  RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     RDX: 00000000000017d9  RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8  RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318
     RBP: ffff882ecc375d20   R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60   R9: ffff88301f272200
     R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffffffffffffffff
     R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8
     ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
  #7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2]
  #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2]
  #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2]
#10 [ffff882ecc375e18] ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work at ffffffffa0a85445 [ocfs2]
#11 [ffff882ecc375e68] ocfs2_downconvert_thread at ffffffffa0a854de [ocfs2]
#12 [ffff882ecc375ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090da7
#13 [ffff882ecc375f48] kernel_thread_helper at ffffffff81511884
assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR.

Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call
chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert.
system_call_fastpath
  -> my_chmod
   -> sys_chmod
    -> sys_fchmodat
     -> notify_change
      -> ocfs2_setattr
       -> posix_acl_chmod
        -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl
         -> ocfs2_set_acl
          -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode
Here is how.
1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1120 {
1247         ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do.
..
1258         if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
1259                 status =  posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode);

519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
520 {
..
539         ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);

287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ...
288 {
289         return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL);

224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
225                          struct inode *inode, ...
231 {
..
252                                 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
253                                                          handle, mode);

168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ...
170 {
183         if (handle == NULL) {
                    >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<<
184                 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
185                                            OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);

ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX
mode (it should be). How this could have happended?

We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in
ocfs2_setattr.#1247.  Note that there are no holders of this lock at
this point.  Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from
EX to PR.  So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in
ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#184.  The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc).
Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked
(the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the
lock is not EX (it is PR).  If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed
the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before
downconverting (to NULL) for the request.

ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path.  If it
does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another
cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting
the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo
that is a mix of the two.

Orabug: 20189959
Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2015
…ap_device_late_init

Kernel fails to boot 50% of times (form build to build) with
RT-patchset applied due to the following race - on late boot
stages deferred_probe_work_func->omap_hsmmc_probe races with omap_device_late_ini.

The same issue has been reported now on linux-next (4.3) by Keerthy [1]

late_initcall
 - deferred_probe_initcal() tries to re-probe all pending driver's probe.

- later on, some driver is probing in this case It's cpsw.c
  (but could be any other drivers)
  cpsw_init
  - platform_driver_register
    - really_probe
       - driver_bound
         - driver_deferred_probe_trigger
  and boot proceed.
  So, at this moment we have deferred_probe_work_func scheduled.

late_initcall_sync
  - omap_device_late_init
    - omap_device_idle

CPU1					CPU2
  - deferred_probe_work_func
    - really_probe
      - omap_hsmmc_probe
	- pm_runtime_get_sync
					late_initcall_sync
					- omap_device_late_init
						if (od->_driver_status != BUS_NOTIFY_BOUND_DRIVER) {
							if (od->_state == OMAP_DEVICE_STATE_ENABLED) {
								- omap_device_idle [ops - IP is disabled]
	- [fail]
	- pm_runtime_put_sync
          - omap_hsmmc_runtime_suspend [ooops!]

== log ==
 omap_hsmmc 480b4000.mmc: unable to get vmmc regulator -517
 davinci_mdio 48485000.mdio: davinci mdio revision 1.6
 davinci_mdio 48485000.mdio: detected phy mask fffffff3
 libphy: 48485000.mdio: probed
 davinci_mdio 48485000.mdio: phy[2]: device 48485000.mdio:02, driver unknown
 davinci_mdio 48485000.mdio: phy[3]: device 48485000.mdio:03, driver unknown
 omap_hsmmc 480b4000.mmc: unable to get vmmc regulator -517
 cpsw 48484000.ethernet: Detected MACID = b4:99:4c:c7:d2:48
 cpsw 48484000.ethernet: cpsw: Detected MACID = b4:99:4c:c7:d2:49
 hctosys: unable to open rtc device (rtc0)
 omap_hsmmc 480b4000.mmc: omap_device_late_idle: enabled but no driver.  Idling
 ldousb: disabling
 Unhandled fault: imprecise external abort (0x1406) at 0x00000000
 [00000000] *pgd=00000000
 Internal error: : 1406 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 1 PID: 58 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 4.1.2-rt1-00467-g6da3c0a-dirty #5
 Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree)
 Workqueue: deferwq deferred_probe_work_func
 task: ee6ddb00 ti: edd3c000 task.ti: edd3c000
 PC is at omap_hsmmc_runtime_suspend+0x1c/0x12c
 LR is at _od_runtime_suspend+0xc/0x24
 pc : [<c0471998>]    lr : [<c0029590>]    psr: a0000013
 sp : edd3dda0  ip : ee6ddb00  fp : c07be540
 r10: 00000000  r9 : c07be540  r8 : 00000008
 r7 : 00000000  r6 : ee646c10  r5 : ee646c10  r4 : edd79380
 r3 : fa0b4100  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 00000000  r0 : ee646c10
 Flags: NzCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment kernel
 Control: 10c5387d  Table: 8000406a  DAC: 00000015
 Process kworker/u4:1 (pid: 58, stack limit = 0xedd3c218)
 Stack: (0xedd3dda0 to 0xedd3e000)
 dda0: ee646c70 ee646c10 c0029584 00000000 00000008 c0029590 ee646c70 ee646c10
 ddc0: c0029584 c03adfb8 ee646c10 00000004 0000000c c03adff0 ee646c10 00000004
 dde0: 0000000c c03ae4ec 00000000 edd3c000 ee646c10 00000004 ee646c70 00000004
 de00: fa0b4000 c03aec20 ee6ddb00 ee646c10 00000004 ee646c70 ee646c10 fffffdfb
 de20: edd79380 00000000 fa0b4000 c03aee90 fffffdfb edd79000 ee646c00 c0474290
 de40: 00000000 edda24c0 edd79380 edc81f00 00000000 00000200 00000001 c06dd488
 de60: edda3960 ee646c10 ee646c10 c0824cc4 fffffdfb c0880c94 00000002 edc92600
 de80: c0836378 c03a7f84 ee646c10 c0824cc4 00000000 c0880c80 c0880c94 c03a6568
 dea0: 00000000 ee646c10 c03a66ac ee4f8000 00000000 00000001 edc92600 c03a4b40
 dec0: ee404c94 edc83c4c ee646c10 ee646c10 ee646c44 c03a63c4 ee646c10 ee646c10
 dee0: c0814448 c03a5aa8 ee646c10 c0814220 edd3c000 c03a5ec0 c0814250 ee6be400
 df00: edd3c000 c004e5bc ee6ddb01 00000078 ee6ddb00 ee4f8000 ee6be418 edd3c000
 df20: ee4f8028 00000088 c0836045 ee4f8000 ee6be400 c004e928 ee4f8028 00000000
 df40: c004e8ec 00000000 ee6bf1c0 ee6be400 c004e8ec 00000000 00000000 00000000
 df60: 00000000 c0053450 2e56fa97 00000000 afdffbd7 ee6be400 00000000 00000000
 df80: edd3df80 edd3df80 00000000 00000000 edd3df90 edd3df90 edd3dfac ee6bf1c0
 dfa0: c0053384 00000000 00000000 c000f668 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
 dfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
 dfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 f1fc9d7e febfbdff
 [<c0471998>] (omap_hsmmc_runtime_suspend) from [<c0029590>] (_od_runtime_suspend+0xc/0x24)
 [<c0029590>] (_od_runtime_suspend) from [<c03adfb8>] (__rpm_callback+0x24/0x3c)
 [<c03adfb8>] (__rpm_callback) from [<c03adff0>] (rpm_callback+0x20/0x80)
 [<c03adff0>] (rpm_callback) from [<c03ae4ec>] (rpm_suspend+0xe4/0x618)
 [<c03ae4ec>] (rpm_suspend) from [<c03aee90>] (__pm_runtime_idle+0x60/0x80)
 [<c03aee90>] (__pm_runtime_idle) from [<c0474290>] (omap_hsmmc_probe+0x6bc/0xa7c)
 [<c0474290>] (omap_hsmmc_probe) from [<c03a7f84>] (platform_drv_probe+0x44/0xa4)
 [<c03a7f84>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c03a6568>] (driver_probe_device+0x170/0x2b4)
 [<c03a6568>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c03a4b40>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x64/0x98)
 [<c03a4b40>] (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c03a63c4>] (device_attach+0x70/0x88)
 [<c03a63c4>] (device_attach) from [<c03a5aa8>] (bus_probe_device+0x84/0xac)
 [<c03a5aa8>] (bus_probe_device) from [<c03a5ec0>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0x58/0x88)
 [<c03a5ec0>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c004e5bc>] (process_one_work+0x134/0x464)
 [<c004e5bc>] (process_one_work) from [<c004e928>] (worker_thread+0x3c/0x4fc)
 [<c004e928>] (worker_thread) from [<c0053450>] (kthread+0xcc/0xe4)
 [<c0053450>] (kthread) from [<c000f668>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c)
 Code: e594302c e593202c e584205c e594302c (e5932128)
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]---

The issue happens because omap_device_late_init() do not take into
account that some drivers are present, but their probes were not
finished successfully and where deferred instead. This is the valid
case, and omap_device_late_init() should not idle such devices.

To fix this issue, the value of omap_device->_driver_status field
should be checked not only for BUS_NOTIFY_BOUND_DRIVER (driver is
present and has been bound to device successfully), but also checked
for BUS_NOTIFY_BIND_DRIVER (driver about to be bound) - which means
driver is present and there was try to bind it to device.

[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg441880.html
Cc: Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com>
Cc: Keerthy <j-keerthy@ti.com>
Tested-by: Keerthy <j-keerthy@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2015
The renesas-irqc interrupt controller is cascaded to the GIC. Hence when
propagating wake-up settings to its parent interrupt controller, the
following lockdep warning is printed:

    =============================================
    [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
    4.2.0-ape6evm-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 #280 Not tainted
    ---------------------------------------------
    s2ram/1072 is trying to acquire lock:
    (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98

    but task is already holding lock:
    (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98

    other info that might help us debug this:
    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	  CPU0
	  ----
     lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
     lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

    May be due to missing lock nesting notation

    6 locks held by s2ram/1072:
    #0:  (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<c012eb14>] __sb_start_write+0xa0/0xa8
    #1:  (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c019396c>] kernfs_fop_write+0x4c/0x1bc
    #2:  (s_active#24){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0193974>] kernfs_fop_write+0x54/0x1bc
    #3:  (pm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c008213c>] pm_suspend+0x10c/0x510
    #4:  (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c02af3c4>] __device_suspend+0xdc/0x2cc
    #5:  (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 0 PID: 1072 Comm: s2ram Not tainted 4.2.0-ape6evm-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 #280
    Hardware name: Generic R8A73A4 (Flattened Device Tree)
    [<c0018078>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c00144f0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
    [<c00144f0>] (show_stack) from [<c0451f14>] (dump_stack+0x88/0x98)
    [<c0451f14>] (dump_stack) from [<c007b29c>] (__lock_acquire+0x15cc/0x20e4)
    [<c007b29c>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c007c6e0>] (lock_acquire+0xac/0x12c)
    [<c007c6e0>] (lock_acquire) from [<c0457c00>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x40/0x54)
    [<c0457c00>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c008d3fc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98)
    [<c008d3fc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock) from [<c008ebbc>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x20/0xf8)
    [<c008ebbc>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c0260770>] (irqc_irq_set_wake+0x20/0x4c)
    [<c0260770>] (irqc_irq_set_wake) from [<c008ec28>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x8c/0xf8)
    [<c008ec28>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c02cb8c0>] (gpio_keys_suspend+0x74/0xc0)
    [<c02cb8c0>] (gpio_keys_suspend) from [<c02ae8cc>] (dpm_run_callback+0x54/0x124)

Avoid this false positive by using a separate lockdep class for IRQC
interrupts.

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Cc: Magnus Damm <magnus.damm@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441798974-25716-2-git-send-email-geert%2Brenesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2015
The renesas-intc-irqpin interrupt controller is cascaded to the GIC.
Hence when propagating wake-up settings to its parent interrupt
controller, the following lockdep warning is printed:

    =============================================
    [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
    4.2.0-armadillo-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 #781 Not tainted
    ---------------------------------------------
    s2ram/1179 is trying to acquire lock:
    (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94

    but task is already holding lock:
    (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94

    other info that might help us debug this:
    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	  CPU0
	  ----
     lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
     lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

    May be due to missing lock nesting notation

    7 locks held by s2ram/1179:
    #0:  (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<c00c9708>] __sb_start_write+0x64/0xb8
    #1:  (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0125a00>] kernfs_fop_write+0x78/0x1a0
    #2:  (s_active#23){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0125a08>] kernfs_fop_write+0x80/0x1a0
    #3:  (autosleep_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0058244>] pm_autosleep_lock+0x18/0x20
    #4:  (pm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0057e50>] pm_suspend+0x54/0x248
    #5:  (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c0243a20>] __device_suspend+0xdc/0x240
    #6:  (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94

    stack backtrace:
    CPU: 0 PID: 1179 Comm: s2ram Not tainted 4.2.0-armadillo-10725-g50fcd7643c034198

    Hardware name: Generic R8A7740 (Flattened Device Tree)
    [<c00129f4>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c0012bec>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c)
    [<c0012bd4>] (show_stack) from [<c03f5d94>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
    [<c03f5d74>] (dump_stack) from [<c00514d4>] (__lock_acquire+0x67c/0x1b88)
    [<c0050e58>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c0052df8>] (lock_acquire+0x9c/0xbc)
    [<c0052d5c>] (lock_acquire) from [<c03fb068>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x58)
    [<c03fb024>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c005bb54>] (__irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94
    [<c005badc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock) from [<c005c3d8>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x28/0x100)
    [<c005c3b0>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c01e50d0>] (intc_irqpin_irq_set_wake+0x24/0x4c)
    [<c01e50ac>] (intc_irqpin_irq_set_wake) from [<c005c17c>] (set_irq_wake_real+0x3c/0x50
    [<c005c140>] (set_irq_wake_real) from [<c005c414>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x64/0x100)
    [<c005c3b0>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c02a19b4>] (gpio_keys_suspend+0x60/0xa0)
    [<c02a1954>] (gpio_keys_suspend) from [<c023b750>] (platform_pm_suspend+0x3c/0x5c)

Avoid this false positive by using a separate lockdep class for INTC
External IRQ Pin interrupts.

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Cc: Magnus Damm <magnus.damm@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441798974-25716-3-git-send-email-geert%2Brenesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 16, 2015
My colleague ran into a program stall on a x86_64 server, where
n_tty_read() was waiting for data even if there was data in the buffer
in the pty.  kernel stack for the stuck process looks like below.
 #0 [ffff88303d107b58] __schedule at ffffffff815c4b20
 #1 [ffff88303d107bd0] schedule at ffffffff815c513e
 #2 [ffff88303d107bf0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815c7818
 #3 [ffff88303d107ca0] wait_woken at ffffffff81096bd2
 #4 [ffff88303d107ce0] n_tty_read at ffffffff8136fa23
 #5 [ffff88303d107dd0] tty_read at ffffffff81368013
 #6 [ffff88303d107e20] __vfs_read at ffffffff811a3704
 #7 [ffff88303d107ec0] vfs_read at ffffffff811a3a57
 #8 [ffff88303d107f00] sys_read at ffffffff811a4306
 #9 [ffff88303d107f50] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath at ffffffff815c86d7

There seems to be two problems causing this issue.

First, in drivers/tty/n_tty.c, __receive_buf() stores the data and
updates ldata->commit_head using smp_store_release() and then checks
the wait queue using waitqueue_active().  However, since there is no
memory barrier, __receive_buf() could return without calling
wake_up_interactive_poll(), and at the same time, n_tty_read() could
start to wait in wait_woken() as in the following chart.

        __receive_buf()                         n_tty_read()
------------------------------------------------------------------------
if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
/* Memory operations issued after the
   RELEASE may be completed before the
   RELEASE operation has completed */
                                        add_wait_queue(&tty->read_wait, &wait);
                                        ...
                                        if (!input_available_p(tty, 0)) {
smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head,
                  ldata->read_head);
                                        ...
                                        timeout = wait_woken(&wait,
                                          TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeout);
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The second problem is that n_tty_read() also lacks a memory barrier
call and could also cause __receive_buf() to return without calling
wake_up_interactive_poll(), and n_tty_read() to wait in wait_woken()
as in the chart below.

        __receive_buf()                         n_tty_read()
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        spin_lock_irqsave(&q->lock, flags);
                                        /* from add_wait_queue() */
                                        ...
                                        if (!input_available_p(tty, 0)) {
                                        /* Memory operations issued after the
                                           RELEASE may be completed before the
                                           RELEASE operation has completed */
smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head,
                  ldata->read_head);
if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
                                        __add_wait_queue(q, wait);
                                        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock,flags);
                                        /* from add_wait_queue() */
                                        ...
                                        timeout = wait_woken(&wait,
                                          TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeout);
------------------------------------------------------------------------

There are also other places in drivers/tty/n_tty.c which have similar
calls to waitqueue_active(), so instead of adding many memory barrier
calls, this patch simply removes the call to waitqueue_active(),
leaving just wake_up*() behind.

This fixes both problems because, even though the memory access before
or after the spinlocks in both wake_up*() and add_wait_queue() can
sneak into the critical section, it cannot go past it and the critical
section assures that they will be serialized (please see "INTER-CPU
ACQUIRING BARRIER EFFECTS" in Documentation/memory-barriers.txt for a
better explanation).  Moreover, the resulting code is much simpler.

Latency measurement using a ping-pong test over a pty doesn't show any
visible performance drop.

Signed-off-by: Kosuke Tatsukawa <tatsu@ab.jp.nec.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
idryomov pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2015
We try to convert the old way of of specifying fb tiling (obj->tiling)
into the new fb modifiers. We store the result in the passed in mode_cmd
structure. But that structure comes directly from the addfb2 ioctl, and
gets copied back out to userspace, which means we're clobbering the
modifiers that the user provided (all 0 since the DRM_MODE_FB_MODIFIERS
flag wasn't even set by the user). Hence if the user reuses the struct
for another addfb2, the ioctl will be rejected since it's now asking for
some modifiers w/o the flag set.

Fix the problem by making a copy of the user provided structure. We can
play any games we want with the copy.

IGT-Version: 1.12-git (x86_64) (Linux: 4.4.0-rc1-stereo+ x86_64)
...
Subtest basic-X-tiled: SUCCESS (0.001s)
Test assertion failure function pitch_tests, file kms_addfb_basic.c:167:
Failed assertion: drmIoctl(fd, DRM_IOCTL_MODE_ADDFB2, &f) == 0
Last errno: 22, Invalid argument
Stack trace:
  #0 [__igt_fail_assert+0x101]
  #1 [pitch_tests+0x619]
  #2 [__real_main426+0x2f]
  #3 [main+0x23]
  #4 [__libc_start_main+0xf0]
  #5 [_start+0x29]
  #6 [<unknown>+0x29]
  Subtest framebuffer-vs-set-tiling failed.
  **** DEBUG ****
  Test assertion failure function pitch_tests, file kms_addfb_basic.c:167:
  Failed assertion: drmIoctl(fd, DRM_IOCTL_MODE_ADDFB2, &f) == 0
  Last errno: 22, Invalid argument
  ****  END  ****
  Subtest framebuffer-vs-set-tiling: FAIL (0.003s)
  ...

IGT-Version: 1.12-git (x86_64) (Linux: 4.4.0-rc1-stereo+ x86_64)
Subtest framebuffer-vs-set-tiling: SUCCESS (0.000s)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Fixes: 2a80ead ("drm/i915: Add fb format modifier support")
Testcase: igt/kms_addfb_basic/clobbered-modifier
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1447261890-3960-1-git-send-email-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
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2 participants