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Follow-up to #262. The v1 slice (policy matrix, harness evaluator, HMAC audit, profile UI) does not confine unprompted CLIs.
Compile the declared matrix (write scopes, network) into a Seatbelt profile and wrap the local CLI child. Fail closed on path canonicalization. Audit every Seatbelt decision with decidingLayer=seatbelt, including matrix-allow / Seatbelt-deny disagreements. Keep electron/sandbox.js honest.
Linux seccomp is out of scope unless cheap. ssh remotes and WSL are not Seatbelt-wrapped.
Blocked on: #262 v1 landing a compile-able matrix schema.
PR #1656 is up, stacked on #1655 (#262 v1). On macOS, a local thread whose profile has write or network rules runs its CLI under sandbox-exec, for every provider:
Writes are confined to the worktree plus allow/ask paths, with deny/block paths carved out.
Network rules route egress through a loopback host-filtering proxy; outbound IP is denied otherwise.
Kernel and proxy denials are audited as layer: seatbelt, and matrix-allow / Seatbelt-deny disagreements are flagged.
Anything that can't be canonicalized refuses the run.
Verified live with the real Claude CLI. The other CLIs haven't been run live under a profile yet.
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currentbits commentedon Oct 16, 2026
PR #1656 is up, stacked on #1655 (#262 v1). On macOS, a local thread whose profile has write or network rules runs its CLI under
sandbox-exec, for every provider:layer: seatbelt, and matrix-allow / Seatbelt-deny disagreements are flagged.Verified live with the real Claude CLI. The other CLIs haven't been run live under a profile yet.
Seatbelt wrap for governed local CLIs: compiled write scopes, proxied…
currentbits commentedon Oct 16, 2026
Landed from Solenta thread "Governance: macOS Seatbelt process wrapper" (PR #1656). Closed on merge.
Governance layer v1: per-profile permission matrix, HMAC audit, Claud…
Seatbelt wrap for governed local CLIs: compiled writes, proxied egress (
Seatbelt tests: keep Stores in tmp so exit flushes cannot litter $HOME (