Merge Linux 3.0.58 by zehome · Pull Request #8 · hardkernel/linux

zehome · 2013-01-12T12:03:23Z

Just a simple merge of kernel.org linux 3.0.58

…gs setting of slave devices. [ Upstream commit 0e376bd ] Patch sets the lowest gso_max_size and gso_max_segs values of the slave devices during enslave and detach. Signed-off-by: Sarveshwar Bandi <sarveshwar.bandi@emulex.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit e196c0e ] Race between bonding_store_slaves_active() and slave manipulation functions. The bond_for_each_slave use in bonding_store_slaves_active() is not protected by any synchronization mechanism. NULL pointer dereference is easy to reach. Fixed by acquiring the bond->lock for the slave walk. v2: Make description text < 75 columns Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

… space fails [ Upstream commit be364c8 ] Trinity (the syscall fuzzer) discovered a memory leak in SCTP, reproducible e.g. with the sendto() syscall by passing invalid user space pointer in the second argument: #include <string.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main(void) { int fd; struct sockaddr_in sa; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/); if (fd < 0) return 1; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sin_family = AF_INET; sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); sa.sin_port = htons(11111); sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)); return 0; } As far as I can tell, the leak has been around since ~2003. Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…syscall [ Upstream commit 6e51fe7 ] Consider the following program, that sets the second argument to the sendto() syscall incorrectly: #include <string.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main(void) { int fd; struct sockaddr_in sa; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/); if (fd < 0) return 1; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sin_family = AF_INET; sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); sa.sin_port = htons(11111); sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)); return 0; } We get -ENOMEM: $ strace -e sendto ./demo sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate memory) Propagate the error code from sctp_user_addto_chunk(), so that we will tell user space what actually went wrong: $ strace -e sendto ./demo sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address) Noticed while running Trinity (the syscall fuzzer). Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit da9da01 ] Without this udev doesn't have a way to key the ne device to the platform device. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 2355a62 ] Signed-off-by: Alexander Shiyan <shc_work@mail.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit af1b85e ] I noticed that the iPhone ethernet driver did not support iPhone 5. I quickly added support to it in my kernel, here's a patch. Signed-off-by: Jay Purohit <jspurohit@velocitylimitless.com> Acked-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Jan Ceuleers <jan.ceuleers@computer.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit cdc87c5 upstream. TEST_ALPHA() is broken and always returns 0. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: return false for '@' as well, per Bjorn] Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b66c598 upstream. If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak into the command line. Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively. However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the userspace argv areas. After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As such, we need to protect the changes to interp. This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or binfmt_misc does an allocation take place. For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from: http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net> Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit ad68652 upstream. Some MSI laptop BIOSes are broken - INT 15h code uses port 92h to enable A20 line but resume code assumes that KBC was used. The laptop will not resume from S3 otherwise but powers off after a while and then powers on again stuck with a blank screen. Fix it by enabling A20 using KBC in i8042_platform_init for x86. Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12878 Signed-off-by: Ondrej Zary <linux@rainbow-software.org> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201212112218.06551.linux@rainbow-software.org Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b92b1b8 upstream. Virtio devices may attempt to add descriptors to a virtqueue from atomic context using GFP_ATOMIC allocation. This is problematic because such allocations can fall outside of the lowmem mapping, causing virt_to_phys to report bogus physical addresses which are subsequently passed to userspace via the buffers for the virtual device. This patch masks out __GFP_HIGH and __GFP_HIGHMEM from the requested flags when allocating descriptors for a virtqueue. If an atomic allocation is requested and later fails, we will return -ENOSPC which will be handled by the driver. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit ad4b3fb upstream. Unfortunately with !CONFIG_PAGEFLAGS_EXTENDED, (!PageHead) is false, and (PageHead) is true, for tail pages. If this is indeed the intended behavior, which I doubt because it breaks cache cleaning on some ARM systems, then the nomenclature is highly problematic. This patch makes sure PageHead is only true for head pages and PageTail is only true for tail pages, and neither is true for non-compound pages. [ This buglet seems ancient - seems to have been introduced back in Apr 2008 in commit 6a1e7f7: "pageflags: convert to the use of new macros". And the reason nobody noticed is because the PageHead() tests are almost all about just sanity-checking, and only used on pages that are actual page heads. The fact that the old code returned true for tail pages too was thus not really noticeable. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu> Acked-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <Will.Deacon@arm.com> Cc: Steve Capper <Steve.Capper@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f2a07f4 upstream. Recently I suggested using "mount -o remount,mpol=local /tmp" in NUMA mempolicy testing. Very nasty. Reading /proc/mounts, /proc/pid/mounts or /proc/pid/mountinfo may then corrupt one bit of kernel memory, often in a page table (causing "Bad swap" or "Bad page map" warning or "Bad pagetable" oops), sometimes in a vm_area_struct or rbnode or somewhere worse. "mpol=prefer" and "mpol=prefer:Node" are equally toxic. Recent NUMA enhancements are not to blame: this dates back to 2.6.35, when commit e17f74a "mempolicy: don't call mpol_set_nodemask() when no_context" skipped mpol_parse_str()'s call to mpol_set_nodemask(), which used to initialize v.preferred_node, or set MPOL_F_LOCAL in flags. With slab poisoning, you can then rely on mpol_to_str() to set the bit for node 0x6b6b, probably in the next page above the caller's stack. mpol_parse_str() is only called from shmem_parse_options(): no_context is always true, so call it unused for now, and remove !no_context code. Set v.nodes or v.preferred_node or MPOL_F_LOCAL as mpol_to_str() might expect. Then mpol_to_str() can ignore its no_context argument also, the mpol being appropriately initialized whether contextualized or not. Rename its no_context unused too, and let subsequent patch remove them (that's not needed for stable backporting, which would involve rejects). I don't understand why MPOL_LOCAL is described as a pseudo-policy: it's a reasonable policy which suffers from a confusing implementation in terms of MPOL_PREFERRED with MPOL_F_LOCAL. I believe this would be much more robust if MPOL_LOCAL were recognized in switch statements throughout, MPOL_F_LOCAL deleted, and MPOL_PREFERRED use the (possibly empty) nodes mask like everyone else, instead of its preferred_node variant (I presume an optimization from the days before MPOL_LOCAL). But that would take me too long to get right and fully tested. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 59866da upstream. Add a similar protection against the disconnection race and the invalid use of usb instance after disconnection, as well as we've done for the USB audio PCM. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=51201 Reviewd-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Tested-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f5f1654 upstream. The commit [88a8516: ALSA: usbaudio: implement USB autosuspend] added the support of autopm for USB MIDI output, but it didn't take the MIDI input into account. This patch adds the following for fixing the autopm: - Manage the URB start at the first MIDI input stream open, instead of the time of instance creation - Move autopm code to the common substream_open() - Make snd_usbmidi_input_start/_stop() more robust and add the running state check Reviewd-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Tested-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3194b7f upstream. Added USB ID for T-Com Sinus 154 data II. Signed-off-by: Tomasz Guszkowski <tsg@o2.pl> Acked-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4010fe2 upstream. This patch adds USBIDs for: - DrayTek Vigor 530 - Zoom 4410a It also adds a note about Gemtek WUBI-100GW and SparkLAN WL-682 USBID conflict [WUBI-100GW is a ISL3886+NET2280 (LM86 firmare) solution, whereas WL-682 is a ISL3887 (LM87 firmware)] device. Source: <http://www.wikidevi.com/wiki/Intersil/p54/usb/windows> Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d0eca71 upstream. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 4f5f64c upstream. At one point acpi_device_set_id() checks if acpi_device_hid(device) returns NULL, but that never happens, so system bus devices with an empty list of PNP IDs are given the dummy HID ("device") instead of the "system bus HID" ("LNXSYBUS"). Fix the code to use the right check. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f259613 upstream. In rare circumstances, nfs_clone_server() of a v2 or v3 server can get an error between setting server->destory (to nfs_destroy_server), and calling nfs_start_lockd (which will set server->nlm_host). If this happens, nfs_clone_server will call nfs_free_server which will call nfs_destroy_server and thence nlmclnt_done(NULL). This causes the NULL to be dereferenced. So add a guard to only call nlmclnt_done() if ->nlm_host is not NULL. The other guards there are irrelevant as nlm_host can only be non-NULL if one of these flags are set - so remove those tests. (Thanks to Trond for this suggestion). This is suitable for any stable kernel since 2.6.25. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1f01845 upstream. It is almost always wrong for NFS to call drop_nlink() after removing a file. What we really want is to mark the inode's attributes for revalidation, and we want to ensure that the VFS drops it if we're reasonably sure that this is the final unlink(). Do the former using the usual cache validity flags, and the latter by testing if inode->i_nlink == 1, and clearing it in that case. This also fixes the following warning reported by Neil Brown and Jeff Layton (among others). [634155.004438] WARNING: at /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/kernel-desktop-3.5.0/lin [634155.004442] Hardware name: Latitude E6510 [634155.004577] crc_itu_t crc32c_intel snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcor [634155.004609] Pid: 13402, comm: bash Tainted: G W 3.5.0-36-desktop # [634155.004611] Call Trace: [634155.004630] [<ffffffff8100444a>] dump_trace+0xaa/0x2b0 [634155.004641] [<ffffffff815a23dc>] dump_stack+0x69/0x6f [634155.004653] [<ffffffff81041a0b>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7b/0xc0 [634155.004662] [<ffffffff811832e4>] drop_nlink+0x34/0x40 [634155.004687] [<ffffffffa05bb6c3>] nfs_dentry_iput+0x33/0x70 [nfs] [634155.004714] [<ffffffff8118049e>] dput+0x12e/0x230 [634155.004726] [<ffffffff8116b230>] __fput+0x170/0x230 [634155.004735] [<ffffffff81167c0f>] filp_close+0x5f/0x90 [634155.004743] [<ffffffff81167cd7>] sys_close+0x97/0x100 [634155.004754] [<ffffffff815c3b39>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [634155.004767] [<00007f2a73a0d110>] 0x7f2a73a0d10f Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d5f50b0 upstream. If the argument and reply together exceed the maximum payload size, then a reply with a read-like operation can overlow the rq_pages array. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e25fbe3 upstream. The following null pointer check is broken. *option = match_strdup(args); return !option; The pointer `option' must be non-null, and thus `!option' is always false. Use `!*option' instead. The bug was introduced in commit c5cb09b ("Cleanup: Factor out some cut-and-paste code."). Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit a455e29 upstream. The driver's timer must be set up before enabling IRQ handler, otherwise bad things may happen. Reported-and-tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Popovec <popovec@fei.tuke.sk> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 04aa530 upstream. Sankara reported that the genirq core code fails to adjust the affinity of an interrupt thread in several cases: 1) On request/setup_irq() the call to setup_affinity() happens before the new action is registered, so the new thread is not notified. 2) For secondary shared interrupts nothing notifies the new thread to change its affinity. 3) Interrupts which have the IRQ_NO_BALANCE flag set are not moving the thread either. Fix this by setting the thread affinity flag right on thread creation time. This ensures that under all circumstances the thread moves to the right place. Requires a check in irq_thread_check_affinity for an existing affinity mask (CONFIG_CPU_MASK_OFFSTACK=y) Reported-and-tested-by: Sankara Muthukrishnan <sankara.m@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1209041738200.2754@ionos Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit bb1e5dd upstream. Like Lynx Point, Lynx Point LP is also switchable. See 1c12443 for more details. This patch should be backported to stable kernels as old as 3.0, that contain commit 69e848c "Intel xhci: Support EHCI/xHCI port switching." Signed-off-by: Russell Webb <russell.webb@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sarah Sharp <sarah.a.sharp@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1754316 upstream. cgroup_create_dir() does weird dancing with dentry refcnt. On success, it gets and then puts it achieving nothing. On failure, it puts but there isn't no matching get anywhere leading to the following oops if cgroup_create_file() fails for whatever reason. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /work/os/work/fs/dcache.c:552! invalid opcode: 0000 [hardkernel#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: CPU 2 Pid: 697, comm: mkdir Not tainted 3.7.0-rc4-work+ hardkernel#3 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811d9c0c>] [<ffffffff811d9c0c>] dput+0x1dc/0x1e0 RSP: 0018:ffff88001a3ebef8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000e5b1ef8 RCX: 0000000000000403 RDX: 0000000000000303 RSI: 2000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000e5b1f58 RBP: ffff88001a3ebf18 R08: ffffffff82c76960 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff880015022080 R11: ffd9bed70f48a041 R12: 00000000ffffffea R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88000e5b1f58 R15: 00007fff57656d60 FS: 00007ff05fcb3800(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004046f0 CR3: 000000001315f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process mkdir (pid: 697, threadinfo ffff88001a3ea000, task ffff880015022080) Stack: ffff88001a3ebf48 00000000ffffffea 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff88001a3ebf38 ffffffff811cc889 0000000000000001 ffff88000e5b1ef8 ffff88001a3ebf68 ffffffff811d1fc9 ffff8800198d7f18 ffff880019106ef8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff811cc889>] done_path_create+0x19/0x50 [<ffffffff811d1fc9>] sys_mkdirat+0x59/0x80 [<ffffffff811d2009>] sys_mkdir+0x19/0x20 [<ffffffff81be1e02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 00 48 8d 90 18 01 00 00 48 89 93 c0 00 00 00 4c 89 a0 18 01 00 00 48 8b 83 a0 00 00 00 83 80 28 01 00 00 01 e8 e6 6f a0 00 eb 92 <0f> 0b 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41 RIP [<ffffffff811d9c0c>] dput+0x1dc/0x1e0 RSP <ffff88001a3ebef8> ---[ end trace 1277bcfd9561ddb0 ]--- Fix it by dropping the unnecessary dget/dput() pair. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 2bbf0a1 upstream. The Way Access Filter in recent AMD CPUs may hurt the performance of some workloads, caused by aliasing issues in the L1 cache. This patch disables it on the affected CPUs. The issue is similar to that one of last year: http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1107.3/00041.html This new patch does not replace the old one, we just need another quirk for newer CPUs. The performance penalty without the patch depends on the circumstances, but is a bit less than the last year's 3%. The workloads affected would be those that access code from the same physical page under different virtual addresses, so different processes using the same libraries with ASLR or multiple instances of PIE-binaries. The code needs to be accessed simultaneously from both cores of the same compute unit. More details can be found here: http://developer.amd.com/Assets/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf CPUs affected are anything with the core known as Piledriver. That includes the new parts of the AMD A-Series (aka Trinity) and the just released new CPUs of the FX-Series (aka Vishera). The model numbering is a bit odd here: FX CPUs have model 2, A-Series has model 10h, with possible extensions to 1Fh. Hence the range of model ids. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <osp@andrep.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1351700450-9277-1-git-send-email-osp@andrep.de Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 45959ee upstream. When gcc inlines a function, it does not mark it with the mcount prologue, which in turn means that inlined functions are not traced by the function tracer. But if CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING is set, then gcc is allowed not to inline a function that is marked inline. Depending on the options and the compiler, a function may or may not be traced by the function tracer, depending on whether gcc decides to inline a function or not. This has caused several problems in the pass becaues gcc is not always consistent with what it decides to inline between different gcc versions. Some places should not be traced (like paravirt native_* functions) and these are mostly marked as inline. When gcc decides not to inline the function, and if that function should not be traced, then the ftrace function tracer will suddenly break when it use to work fine. This becomes even harder to debug when different versions of gcc will not inline that function, making the same kernel and config work for some gcc versions and not work for others. By making all functions marked inline to not be traced will remove the ambiguity that gcc adds when it comes to tracing functions marked inline. All gcc versions will be consistent with what functions are traced and having volatile working code will be removed. Note, only the inline macro when CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING is set needs to have notrace added, as the attribute __always_inline will force the function to be inlined and then not traced. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The crash[1] is found by xfstests/generic/208 with "-o compress", it's not reproduced everytime, but it does panic. The bug is quite interesting, it's actually introduced by a recent commit (573aeca, Btrfs: actually limit the size of delalloc range). Btrfs implements delay allocation, so during writeback, we (1) get a page A and lock it (2) search the state tree for delalloc bytes and lock all pages within the range (3) process the delalloc range, including find disk space and create ordered extent and so on. (4) submit the page A. It runs well in normal cases, but if we're in a racy case, eg. buffered compressed writes and aio-dio writes, sometimes we may fail to lock all pages in the 'delalloc' range, in which case, we need to fall back to search the state tree again with a smaller range limit(max_bytes = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset). The mentioned commit has a side effect, that is, in the fallback case, we can find delalloc bytes before the index of the page we already have locked, so we're in the case of (delalloc_end <= *start) and return with (found > 0). This ends with not locking delalloc pages but making ->writepage still process them, and the crash happens. This fixes it by just thinking that we find nothing and returning to caller as the caller knows how to deal with it properly. [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2170! [...] CPU: 2 PID: 11755 Comm: btrfs-delalloc- Tainted: G O 3.11.0+ #8 [...] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810f5093>] [<ffffffff810f5093>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1e/0x83 [...] [ 4934.248731] Stack: [ 4934.248731] ffff8801477e5dc8 ffffea00049b9f00 ffff8801869f9ce8 ffffffffa02b841a [ 4934.248731] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000fff 0000000000000620 [ 4934.248731] ffff88018db59c78 ffffea0005da8d40 ffffffffa02ff860 00000001810016c0 [ 4934.248731] Call Trace: [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02b841a>] extent_range_clear_dirty_for_io+0xcf/0xf5 [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02a8889>] compress_file_range+0x1dc/0x4cb [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff8104f7af>] ? detach_if_pending+0x22/0x4b [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02a8bad>] async_cow_start+0x35/0x53 [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02c694b>] worker_loop+0x14b/0x48c [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffffa02c6800>] ? btrfs_queue_worker+0x25c/0x25c [btrfs] [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff810608f5>] kthread+0x8d/0x95 [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff81060868>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x43/0x43 [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff814fe09c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 4934.248731] [<ffffffff81060868>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x43/0x43 [ 4934.248731] Code: ff 85 c0 0f 94 c0 0f b6 c0 59 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 48 89 fb e8 2c de 00 00 49 89 c4 48 8b 03 a8 01 75 02 <0f> 0b 4d 85 e4 74 52 49 8b 84 24 80 00 00 00 f6 40 20 01 75 44 [ 4934.248731] RIP [<ffffffff810f5093>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1e/0x83 [ 4934.248731] RSP <ffff8801869f9c48> [ 4934.280307] ---[ end trace 36f06d3f8750236a ]--- Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>

…CIe cards The band selection and PE control code for the RT3593 chipsets only handles USB based devices currently. Due to this limitation RT3593 based PCIe cards are not working correctly. On PCIe cards band selection is controlled via GPIO #8 which is identical to the USB devices. The LNA PE control is slightly different, all LNA PEs are controlled by GPIO #4. Update the code to configure the GPIO_CTRL register correctly on PCIe devices. Cc: Steven Liu <steven.liu@mediatek.com> Cc: JasonYS Cheng <jasonys.cheng@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Gabor Juhos <juhosg@openwrt.org> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>

As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online. Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the system, like this: [ 0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 OK [ 1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 OK [ 1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 OK [ 2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node 4, Processors: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 OK [ 3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node 5, Processors: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 OK [ 3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node 6, Processors: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 OK [ 4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node 7, Processors: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 OK [ 4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs and this: [ 0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 OK [ 0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130927143554.GF4422@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Turn it into (for example): [ 0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 0.074005] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 [ 0.603005] .... node #1, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 [ 1.200005] .... node #2, CPUs: #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23 [ 1.796005] .... node #3, CPUs: #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30 #31 [ 2.393005] .... node #4, CPUs: #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 [ 2.996005] .... node #5, CPUs: #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 [ 3.600005] .... node #6, CPUs: #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 [ 4.202005] .... node #7, CPUs: #56 #57 #58 #59 #60 #61 #62 #63 [ 4.811005] .... node #8, CPUs: #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70 #71 [ 5.421006] .... node #9, CPUs: #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 [ 6.032005] .... node #10, CPUs: #80 #81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 [ 6.648006] .... node #11, CPUs: #88 #89 #90 #91 #92 #93 #94 #95 [ 7.262005] .... node #12, CPUs: #96 #97 #98 #99 #100 #101 #102 #103 [ 7.865005] .... node #13, CPUs: #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111 [ 8.466005] .... node #14, CPUs: #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119 [ 9.073006] .... node #15, CPUs: #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127 [ 9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs and drop useless elements. Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a Saturday evening. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

…ux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot changes from Ingo Molnar: "Two changes that prettify and compactify the SMP bootup output from: smpboot: Booting Node 0, Processors #1 #2 #3 OK smpboot: Booting Node 1, Processors #4 #5 #6 #7 OK smpboot: Booting Node 2, Processors #8 #9 #10 #11 OK smpboot: Booting Node 3, Processors #12 #13 #14 #15 OK Brought up 16 CPUs to something like: x86: Booting SMP configuration: .... node #0, CPUs: #1 #2 #3 .... node #1, CPUs: #4 #5 #6 #7 .... node #2, CPUs: #8 #9 #10 #11 .... node #3, CPUs: #12 #13 #14 #15 x86: Booted up 4 nodes, 16 CPUs" * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message x86: Improve the printout of the SMP bootup CPU table

commit 057db84 upstream. Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

the 'soc' node in the common .dtsi for MPC5121 has an '#interrupt-cells' property although this node is not an interrupt controller remove this erroneously placed property because starting with v3.13-rc1 lookup and resolution of 'interrupts' specs for peripherals gets misled, emits 'no irq domain found' WARN() messages and breaks the boot process irq: no irq domain found for /soc@80000000 ! ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at drivers/of/platform.c:171 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc1-00001-g8a66234 #8 task: df823bb0 ti: df834000 task.ti: df834000 NIP: c02b5190 LR: c02b5180 CTR: c01cf4e0 REGS: df835c5 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (3.13.0-rc1-00001-g8a66234) MSR: 00029032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 229a9d42 XER: 20000000 GPR00: c02b5180 df835d00 df823bb0 00000000 00000000 df835b18 ffffffff 00000308 GPR08: c0479cc0 c0480000 c0479cc0 00000308 00000308 00000000 c00040fc 00000000 GPR16: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 df850880 GPR24: df84d670 00000000 00000001 df8561a dffffccc df85089c 00000020 00000001 NIP [c02b5190] of_device_alloc+0xf4/0x1a0 LR [c02b5180] of_device_alloc+0xe4/0x1a0 Call Trace: [df835d00] [c02b5180] of_device_alloc+0xe4/0x1a0 (unreliable) [df835d50] [c02b5278] of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x3c/0xc8 [df835d70] [c02b53fc] of_platform_bus_create+0xf8/0x170 [df835dc0] [c02b5448] of_platform_bus_create+0x144/0x170 [df835e10] [c02b55a8] of_platform_bus_probe+0x98/0xe8 [df835e30] [c0437508] mpc512x_init+0x28/0x1c4 [df835e7] [c0435de8] ppc_init+0x4c/0x60 [df835e80] [c0003b28] do_one_initcall+0x150/0x1a4 [df835ef0] [c0432048] kernel_init_freeable+0x114/0x1c0 [df835f30] [c0004114] kernel_init+0x18/0x124 [df835f40] [c000e910] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: 409effd4 57c9103a 57de2834 7c89f050 7f83e378 7c972214 7f45d37 48001f55 7c63d278 7c630034 5463d97e 687a0001 <0f1a0000> 2f990000 387b0010 939b0098 ---[ end trace 2257f10e5a20cbdd ]--- ... irq: no irq domain found for /soc@80000000 ! fsl-diu-fb 80002100.display: could not get DIU IRQ fsl-diu-fb: probe of 80002100.display failed with error -22 irq: no irq domain found for /soc@80000000 ! mpc512x_dma 80014000.dma: Error mapping IRQ! mpc512x_dma: probe of 80014000.dma failed with error -22 ... irq: no irq domain found for /soc@80000000 ! fs_enet: probe of 80002800.ethernet failed with error -22 ... irq: no irq domain found for /soc@80000000 ! mpc5121-rtc 80000a00.rtc: mpc5121_rtc_probe: could not request irq: 0 mpc5121-rtc: probe of 80000a00.rtc failed with error -22 ... Cc: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gerhard Sittig <gsi@denx.de> Signed-off-by: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de>

Lockdep reported that there is a potential for deadlock because vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock is not irq-safe, and is sometimes taken inside the rq_lock (run-queue lock) in the scheduler, which is taken within interrupts. The lockdep splat looks like: ====================================================== [ INFO: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected ] 3.12.0-rc5-kvm+ #8 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ qemu-system-ppc/4803 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: (&(&vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock)->rlock){+.+...}, at: [<c0000000000947ac>] .kvmppc_core_vcpu_put_hv+0x2c/0xa0 and this task is already holding: (&rq->lock){-.-.-.}, at: [<c000000000ac16c0>] .__schedule+0x180/0xaa0 which would create a new lock dependency: (&rq->lock){-.-.-.} -> (&(&vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock)->rlock){+.+...} but this new dependency connects a HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&rq->lock){-.-.-.} ... which became HARDIRQ-irq-safe at: [<c00000000013797c>] .lock_acquire+0xbc/0x190 [<c000000000ac3c74>] ._raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x60 [<c0000000000f8564>] .scheduler_tick+0x54/0x180 [<c0000000000c2610>] .update_process_times+0x70/0xa0 [<c00000000012cdfc>] .tick_periodic+0x3c/0xe0 [<c00000000012cec8>] .tick_handle_periodic+0x28/0xb0 [<c00000000001ef40>] .timer_interrupt+0x120/0x2e0 [<c000000000002868>] decrementer_common+0x168/0x180 [<c0000000001c7ca4>] .get_page_from_freelist+0x924/0xc10 [<c0000000001c8e00>] .__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x200/0xba0 [<c0000000001c9eb8>] .alloc_pages_exact_nid+0x68/0x110 [<c000000000f4c3ec>] .page_cgroup_init+0x1e0/0x270 [<c000000000f24480>] .start_kernel+0x3e0/0x4e4 [<c000000000009d30>] .start_here_common+0x20/0x70 to a HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: (&(&vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock)->rlock){+.+...} ... which became HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe at: ... [<c00000000013797c>] .lock_acquire+0xbc/0x190 [<c000000000ac3c74>] ._raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x60 [<c0000000000946ac>] .kvmppc_core_vcpu_load_hv+0x2c/0x100 [<c00000000008394c>] .kvmppc_core_vcpu_load+0x2c/0x40 [<c000000000081000>] .kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x10/0x30 [<c00000000007afd4>] .vcpu_load+0x64/0xd0 [<c00000000007b0f8>] .kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x68/0x730 [<c00000000025530c>] .do_vfs_ioctl+0x4dc/0x7a0 [<c000000000255694>] .SyS_ioctl+0xc4/0xe0 [<c000000000009ee4>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98 Some users have reported this deadlock occurring in practice, though the reports have been primarily on 3.10.x-based kernels. This fixes the problem by making tbacct_lock be irq-safe. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

Check DMA mapping return values in function ioat_dma_self_test() to get rid of following warning message. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1203 at lib/dma-debug.c:937 check_unmap+0x4c0/0x9a0() ioatdma 0000:00:04.0: DMA-API: device driver failed to check map error[device address=0x000000085191b000] [size=2000 bytes] [mapped as single] Modules linked in: ioatdma(+) mac_hid wmi acpi_pad lp parport hidd_generic usbhid hid ixgbe isci dca libsas ahci ptp libahci scsi_transport_sas meegaraid_sas pps_core mdio CPU: 0 PID: 1203 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4+ #8 Hardware name: Intel Corporation BRICKLAND/BRICKLAND, BIOS BRIVTIIN1.86B.0044.L09.1311181644 11/18/2013 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x4d/0x66 warn_slowpath_common+0x7d/0xa0 warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4c/0x50 check_unmap+0x4c0/0x9a0 debug_dma_unmap_page+0x81/0x90 ioat_dma_self_test+0x3d2/0x680 [ioatdma] ioat3_dma_self_test+0x12/0x30 [ioatdma] ioat_probe+0xf4/0x110 [ioatdma] ioat3_dma_probe+0x268/0x410 [ioatdma] ioat_pci_probe+0x122/0x1b0 [ioatdma] local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0 pci_device_probe+0xd9/0x130 driver_probe_device+0x171/0x490 __driver_attach+0x93/0xa0 bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0 driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 bus_add_driver+0x1f8/0x2b0 driver_register+0x81/0x110 __pci_register_driver+0x60/0x70 ioat_init_module+0x89/0x1000 [ioatdma] do_one_initcall+0xe2/0x250 load_module+0x2313/0x2a00 SyS_init_module+0xd9/0x130 system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f ---[ end trace 990c591681d27c31 ]--- Mapped at: debug_dma_map_page+0xbe/0x180 ioat_dma_self_test+0x1ab/0x680 [ioatdma] ioat3_dma_self_test+0x12/0x30 [ioatdma] ioat_probe+0xf4/0x110 [ioatdma] ioat3_dma_probe+0x268/0x410 [ioatdma] Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> Cc: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit d25f06e upstream. vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded. It directly calls vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine. As the netpoll controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll method run concurrently. The result is data corruption causing panics such as this one recently observed: PID: 1371 TASK: ffff88023762caa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg" #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b #1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 #2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570 #3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b #4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4 #5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 #6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968] RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80 RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0 RCX: 00000000000000c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005f2 RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0 RBP: ffff88023abd5b48 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff88023a3b6048 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8802398d4cd8 R13: ffff88023af35140 R14: ffff88023b60c890 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3] #8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3] #9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7 The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames Tested by myself, successfully. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> CC: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…king Daniel Borkmann reported a VM_BUG_ON assertion failing: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/mlock.c:528! invalid opcode: 0000 [hardkernel#1] SMP Modules linked in: ccm arc4 iwldvm [...] video CPU: 3 PID: 2266 Comm: netsniff-ng Not tainted 3.14.0-rc2+ hardkernel#8 Hardware name: LENOVO 2429BP3/2429BP3, BIOS G4ET37WW (1.12 ) 05/29/2012 task: ffff8801f87f9820 ti: ffff88002cb44000 task.ti: ffff88002cb44000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81171ad0>] [<ffffffff81171ad0>] munlock_vma_pages_range+0x2e0/0x2f0 Call Trace: do_munmap+0x18f/0x3b0 vm_munmap+0x41/0x60 SyS_munmap+0x22/0x30 system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f RIP munlock_vma_pages_range+0x2e0/0x2f0 ---[ end trace a0088dcf07ae10f2 ]--- because munlock_vma_pages_range() thinks it's unexpectedly in the middle of a THP page. This can be reproduced with default config since 3.11 kernels. A reproducer can be found in the kernel's selftest directory for networking by running ./psock_tpacket. The problem is that an order=2 compound page (allocated by alloc_one_pg_vec_page() is part of the munlocked VM_MIXEDMAP vma (mapped by packet_mmap()) and mistaken for a THP page and assumed to be order=9. The checks for THP in munlock came with commit ff6a6da ("mm: accelerate munlock() treatment of THP pages"), i.e. since 3.9, but did not trigger a bug. It just makes munlock_vma_pages_range() skip such compound pages until the next 512-pages-aligned page, when it encounters a head page. This is however not a problem for vma's where mlocking has no effect anyway, but it can distort the accounting. Since commit 7225522 ("mm: munlock: batch non-THP page isolation and munlock+putback using pagevec") this can trigger a VM_BUG_ON in PageTransHuge() check. This patch fixes the issue by adding VM_MIXEDMAP flag to VM_SPECIAL, a list of flags that make vma's non-mlockable and non-mergeable. The reasoning is that VM_MIXEDMAP vma's are similar to VM_PFNMAP, which is already on the VM_SPECIAL list, and both are intended for non-LRU pages where mlocking makes no sense anyway. Related Lkml discussion can be found in [2]. [1] tools/testing/selftests/net/psock_tpacket [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/1/10/427 Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com> Tested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.11.x+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded. It directly calls vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine. As the netpoll controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll method run concurrently. The result is data corruption causing panics such as this one recently observed: PID: 1371 TASK: ffff88023762caa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg" #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b hardkernel#1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 hardkernel#2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570 hardkernel#3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b hardkernel#4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4 hardkernel#5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 hardkernel#6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968] RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80 RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0 RCX: 00000000000000c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005f2 RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0 RBP: ffff88023abd5b48 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff88023a3b6048 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8802398d4cd8 R13: ffff88023af35140 R14: ffff88023b60c890 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 hardkernel#7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3] hardkernel#8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3] hardkernel#9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7 The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames Tested by myself, successfully. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> CC: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

…king commit 9050d7e upstream. Daniel Borkmann reported a VM_BUG_ON assertion failing: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/mlock.c:528! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ccm arc4 iwldvm [...] video CPU: 3 PID: 2266 Comm: netsniff-ng Not tainted 3.14.0-rc2+ #8 Hardware name: LENOVO 2429BP3/2429BP3, BIOS G4ET37WW (1.12 ) 05/29/2012 task: ffff8801f87f9820 ti: ffff88002cb44000 task.ti: ffff88002cb44000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81171ad0>] [<ffffffff81171ad0>] munlock_vma_pages_range+0x2e0/0x2f0 Call Trace: do_munmap+0x18f/0x3b0 vm_munmap+0x41/0x60 SyS_munmap+0x22/0x30 system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f RIP munlock_vma_pages_range+0x2e0/0x2f0 ---[ end trace a0088dcf07ae10f2 ]--- because munlock_vma_pages_range() thinks it's unexpectedly in the middle of a THP page. This can be reproduced with default config since 3.11 kernels. A reproducer can be found in the kernel's selftest directory for networking by running ./psock_tpacket. The problem is that an order=2 compound page (allocated by alloc_one_pg_vec_page() is part of the munlocked VM_MIXEDMAP vma (mapped by packet_mmap()) and mistaken for a THP page and assumed to be order=9. The checks for THP in munlock came with commit ff6a6da ("mm: accelerate munlock() treatment of THP pages"), i.e. since 3.9, but did not trigger a bug. It just makes munlock_vma_pages_range() skip such compound pages until the next 512-pages-aligned page, when it encounters a head page. This is however not a problem for vma's where mlocking has no effect anyway, but it can distort the accounting. Since commit 7225522 ("mm: munlock: batch non-THP page isolation and munlock+putback using pagevec") this can trigger a VM_BUG_ON in PageTransHuge() check. This patch fixes the issue by adding VM_MIXEDMAP flag to VM_SPECIAL, a list of flags that make vma's non-mlockable and non-mergeable. The reasoning is that VM_MIXEDMAP vma's are similar to VM_PFNMAP, which is already on the VM_SPECIAL list, and both are intended for non-LRU pages where mlocking makes no sense anyway. Related Lkml discussion can be found in [2]. [1] tools/testing/selftests/net/psock_tpacket [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/1/10/427 Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com> Tested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d25f06e upstream. vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded. It directly calls vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine. As the netpoll controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll method run concurrently. The result is data corruption causing panics such as this one recently observed: PID: 1371 TASK: ffff88023762caa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg" #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b #1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 #2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570 #3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b #4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4 #5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 #6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968] RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80 RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0 RCX: 00000000000000c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005f2 RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0 RBP: ffff88023abd5b48 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff88023a3b6048 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8802398d4cd8 R13: ffff88023af35140 R14: ffff88023b60c890 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3] #8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3] #9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7 The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames Tested by myself, successfully. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> CC: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d25f06e upstream. vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded. It directly calls vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine. As the netpoll controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll method run concurrently. The result is data corruption causing panics such as this one recently observed: PID: 1371 TASK: ffff88023762caa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg" #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b #1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 #2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570 #3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b #4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4 #5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 #6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968] RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80 RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0 RCX: 00000000000000c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005f2 RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0 RBP: ffff88023abd5b48 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff88023a3b6048 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8802398d4cd8 R13: ffff88023af35140 R14: ffff88023b60c890 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3] #8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3] #9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7 The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames Tested by myself, successfully. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> CC: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 057db84 upstream. Andrey reported the following report: ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3 ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3) Accessed by thread T13003: #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440) hardkernel#1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40) hardkernel#2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20) hardkernel#3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260) hardkernel#4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360) hardkernel#5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30) hardkernel#6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140) hardkernel#7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0) hardkernel#8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130) hardkernel#9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30) hardkernel#10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Allocated by thread T5167: #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0) hardkernel#1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500) hardkernel#2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90) hardkernel#3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0) hardkernel#4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40) hardkernel#5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430) hardkernel#6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0) hardkernel#7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710) hardkernel#8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50) hardkernel#9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0) hardkernel#10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0) hardkernel#11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50) hardkernel#12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap redzone: fa Heap kmalloc redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Shadow gap: fe The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;' Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size. Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory. Luckily, only root user has write access to this file. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d25f06e upstream. vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded. It directly calls vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine. As the netpoll controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll method run concurrently. The result is data corruption causing panics such as this one recently observed: PID: 1371 TASK: ffff88023762caa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg" #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b hardkernel#1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 hardkernel#2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570 hardkernel#3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b hardkernel#4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4 hardkernel#5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 hardkernel#6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968] RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80 RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0 RCX: 00000000000000c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005f2 RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0 RBP: ffff88023abd5b48 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff88023a3b6048 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8802398d4cd8 R13: ffff88023af35140 R14: ffff88023b60c890 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 hardkernel#7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3] hardkernel#8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3] hardkernel#9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7 The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames Tested by myself, successfully. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> CC: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

When plugging a specific micro SD card at MMC socket of a custom i.MX28 board, we get the following kernel warning: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30 at drivers/mmc/host/mxs-mmc.c:342 mxs_mmc_start_cmd+0x34c/0x378() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 30 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 3.14.0-rc5 hardkernel#8 Workqueue: kmmcd mmc_rescan [<c0015420>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0012cb0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c0012cb0>] (show_stack) from [<c001daf8>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x6c/0x8c) [<c001daf8>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c001db34>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) [<c001db34>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<c0349478>] (mxs_mmc_start_cmd+0x34c/0x378) [<c0349478>] (mxs_mmc_start_cmd) from [<c0338fa0>] (mmc_start_request+0xc4/0xf4) [<c0338fa0>] (mmc_start_request) from [<c03390b4>] (mmc_wait_for_req+0x50/0x164) [<c03390b4>] (mmc_wait_for_req) from [<c03405b8>] (mmc_app_send_scr+0x158/0x1c8) [<c03405b8>] (mmc_app_send_scr) from [<c033ee1c>] (mmc_sd_setup_card+0x80/0x3c8) [<c033ee1c>] (mmc_sd_setup_card) from [<c033f788>] (mmc_sd_init_card+0x124/0x66c) [<c033f788>] (mmc_sd_init_card) from [<c033fd7c>] (mmc_attach_sd+0xac/0x174) [<c033fd7c>] (mmc_attach_sd) from [<c033a658>] (mmc_rescan+0x25c/0x2d8) [<c033a658>] (mmc_rescan) from [<c003597c>] (process_one_work+0x1b4/0x4ec) [<c003597c>] (process_one_work) from [<c0035de4>] (worker_thread+0x130/0x464) [<c0035de4>] (worker_thread) from [<c003c824>] (kthread+0xb4/0xd0) [<c003c824>] (kthread) from [<c000f420>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x34) The error is due to an invalid value in CSD register of a specific 2GB micro SD card. The CSD version of this card is 1.0 but the TACC field has the invalid value 0. cid:0000005553442020000000000000583f csd:00000032535a83bfedb7ffbf1680003f date:08/2005 erase_size:512 fwrev:0x0 hwrev:0x0 manfid:0x000000 name:USD oemid:0x0000 preferred_erase_size:4194304 scr:0225000000000000 serial:0x00000000 type:SD Since the kernel is making use of this TACC field to calculate the SD card timeout, an invalid value 0 leads to a warning at mxs_ns_to_ssp_ticks() and later the following misleading error message appears in a loop: mxs-mmc 80010000.ssp: card claims to support voltages below defined range mxs-mmc 80010000.ssp: no support for card's volts mmc0: error -22 whilst initialising MMC card This error is only found on this 2GB SD card on mxs platform. On x86 this card works without any problems. The following patch based on the work of Peter Chan and Otavio Salvador. It catches the case that the determined timeout is still 0 and sets it to a valid value. Successful tested on a i.MX28 board. Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Chris Ball <chris@printf.net>

All tests should pass with and without JIT. Example output: test_bpf: #0 TAX 35 16 16 PASS test_bpf: #1 TXA 7 7 7 PASS test_bpf: #2 ADD_SUB_MUL_K 10 PASS test_bpf: #3 DIV_KX 33 PASS test_bpf: hardkernel#4 AND_OR_LSH_K 10 10 PASS test_bpf: hardkernel#5 LD_IND 8 8 8 PASS test_bpf: hardkernel#6 LD_ABS 8 8 8 PASS test_bpf: hardkernel#7 LD_ABS_LL 13 14 PASS test_bpf: hardkernel#8 LD_IND_LL 12 12 12 PASS test_bpf: hardkernel#9 LD_ABS_NET 10 12 PASS test_bpf: hardkernel#10 LD_IND_NET 11 12 12 PASS ... Numbers are times in nsec per filter for given input data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch tries to fix this crash: hardkernel#5 [ffff88003c1cd690] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810166d5 hardkernel#6 [ffff88003c1cd730] invalid_op at ffffffff8159b2de [exception RIP: ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks+359] RIP: ffffffffa05dfa27 RSP: ffff88003c1cd7e8 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003c1cdaa8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff880027a95000 RDI: ffff88003c79b540 RBP: ffff88003c1cd858 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffffffff815f6ba0 R10: 00000000000001c9 R11: 00000000000001c9 R12: ffff88002d271500 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000001000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 hardkernel#7 [ffff88003c1cd860] do_direct_IO at ffffffff811cd31b hardkernel#8 [ffff88003c1cd950] direct_IO_iovec at ffffffff811cde9c hardkernel#9 [ffff88003c1cd9b0] do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce764 hardkernel#10 [ffff88003c1cdb80] __blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff811ce7cc hardkernel#11 [ffff88003c1cdbb0] ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffa05df756 [ocfs2] hardkernel#12 [ffff88003c1cdbe0] generic_file_direct_write_iter at ffffffff8112f935 hardkernel#13 [ffff88003c1cdc40] ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffa0600ccc [ocfs2] hardkernel#14 [ffff88003c1cdd50] do_aio_write at ffffffff8119126c hardkernel#15 [ffff88003c1cddc0] aio_rw_vect_retry at ffffffff811d9bb4 hardkernel#16 [ffff88003c1cddf0] aio_run_iocb at ffffffff811db880 hardkernel#17 [ffff88003c1cde30] io_submit_one at ffffffff811dc238 hardkernel#18 [ffff88003c1cde80] do_io_submit at ffffffff811dc437 hardkernel#19 [ffff88003c1cdf70] sys_io_submit at ffffffff811dc530 hardkernel#20 [ffff88003c1cdf80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8159a159 It crashes at BUG_ON(create && (ext_flags & OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED)); in ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks. ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks is expecting the OCFS2_EXT_REFCOUNTED be removed in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() if it was there. But no cluster lock is taken during the time before (or inside) ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write() and after ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks(). It can happen in this case: Node A(which crashes) Node B ------------------------ --------------------------- ocfs2_file_aio_write ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #no refcount found .... ocfs2_reflink ocfs2_inode_lock ... ocfs2_inode_unlock #now, refcount flag set on extent ... flush change to disk ocfs2_direct_IO_get_blocks ocfs2_get_clusters #extent map miss #buffer_head miss read extents from disk found refcount flag on extent crash.. Fix: Take rw_lock in ocfs2_reflink path Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

…king commit 9050d7e upstream. Daniel Borkmann reported a VM_BUG_ON assertion failing: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/mlock.c:528! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ccm arc4 iwldvm [...] video CPU: 3 PID: 2266 Comm: netsniff-ng Not tainted 3.14.0-rc2+ #8 Hardware name: LENOVO 2429BP3/2429BP3, BIOS G4ET37WW (1.12 ) 05/29/2012 task: ffff8801f87f9820 ti: ffff88002cb44000 task.ti: ffff88002cb44000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81171ad0>] [<ffffffff81171ad0>] munlock_vma_pages_range+0x2e0/0x2f0 Call Trace: do_munmap+0x18f/0x3b0 vm_munmap+0x41/0x60 SyS_munmap+0x22/0x30 system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f RIP munlock_vma_pages_range+0x2e0/0x2f0 ---[ end trace a0088dcf07ae10f2 ]--- because munlock_vma_pages_range() thinks it's unexpectedly in the middle of a THP page. This can be reproduced with default config since 3.11 kernels. A reproducer can be found in the kernel's selftest directory for networking by running ./psock_tpacket. The problem is that an order=2 compound page (allocated by alloc_one_pg_vec_page() is part of the munlocked VM_MIXEDMAP vma (mapped by packet_mmap()) and mistaken for a THP page and assumed to be order=9. The checks for THP in munlock came with commit ff6a6da ("mm: accelerate munlock() treatment of THP pages"), i.e. since 3.9, but did not trigger a bug. It just makes munlock_vma_pages_range() skip such compound pages until the next 512-pages-aligned page, when it encounters a head page. This is however not a problem for vma's where mlocking has no effect anyway, but it can distort the accounting. Since commit 7225522 ("mm: munlock: batch non-THP page isolation and munlock+putback using pagevec") this can trigger a VM_BUG_ON in PageTransHuge() check. This patch fixes the issue by adding VM_MIXEDMAP flag to VM_SPECIAL, a list of flags that make vma's non-mlockable and non-mergeable. The reasoning is that VM_MIXEDMAP vma's are similar to VM_PFNMAP, which is already on the VM_SPECIAL list, and both are intended for non-LRU pages where mlocking makes no sense anyway. Related Lkml discussion can be found in [2]. [1] tools/testing/selftests/net/psock_tpacket [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/1/10/427 Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Cc: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com> Tested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

commit d25f06e upstream. vmxnet3's netpoll driver is incorrectly coded. It directly calls vmxnet3_do_poll, which is the driver internal napi poll routine. As the netpoll controller method doesn't block real napi polls in any way, there is a potential for race conditions in which the netpoll controller method and the napi poll method run concurrently. The result is data corruption causing panics such as this one recently observed: PID: 1371 TASK: ffff88023762caa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rs:main Q:Reg" #0 [ffff88023abd5780] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b #1 [ffff88023abd57e0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 #2 [ffff88023abd58b0] oops_end at ffffffff8152b570 #3 [ffff88023abd58e0] die at ffffffff81010e0b #4 [ffff88023abd5910] do_trap at ffffffff8152add4 #5 [ffff88023abd5970] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 #6 [ffff88023abd5a10] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+1968] RIP: ffffffffa00f1e80 RSP: ffff88023abd5ac8 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88023b5dcee0 RCX: 00000000000000c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000005f2 RDI: ffff88023b5dcee0 RBP: ffff88023abd5b48 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff88023a3b6048 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8802398d4cd8 R13: ffff88023af35140 R14: ffff88023b60c890 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88023abd5b50] vmxnet3_do_poll at ffffffffa00f204a [vmxnet3] #8 [ffff88023abd5b80] vmxnet3_netpoll at ffffffffa00f209c [vmxnet3] #9 [ffff88023abd5ba0] netpoll_poll_dev at ffffffff81472bb7 The fix is to do as other drivers do, and have the poll controller call the top half interrupt handler, which schedules a napi poll properly to recieve frames Tested by myself, successfully. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Shreyas Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> CC: "VMware, Inc." <pv-drivers@vmware.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Shreyas N Bhatewara <sbhatewara@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

commit 651e22f upstream. When performing a consuming read, the ring buffer swaps out a page from the ring buffer with a empty page and this page that was swapped out becomes the new reader page. The reader page is owned by the reader and since it was swapped out of the ring buffer, writers do not have access to it (there's an exception to that rule, but it's out of scope for this commit). When reading the "trace" file, it is a non consuming read, which means that the data in the ring buffer will not be modified. When the trace file is opened, a ring buffer iterator is allocated and writes to the ring buffer are disabled, such that the iterator will not have issues iterating over the data. Although the ring buffer disabled writes, it does not disable other reads, or even consuming reads. If a consuming read happens, then the iterator is reset and starts reading from the beginning again. My tests would sometimes trigger this bug on my i386 box: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5175 at kernel/trace/trace.c:1527 __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 5175 Comm: grep Not tainted 3.16.0-rc3-test+ #8 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 00000000 00000000 f09c9e1c c18796b3 c1b5d74c f09c9e4c c103a0e3 c1b5154b f09c9e78 00001437 c1b5d74c 000005f7 c10bd85a c10bd85a c1cac57c f09c9eb0 ed0e0000 f09c9e64 c103a185 00000009 f09c9e5c c1b5154b f09c9e78 f09c9e80^M Call Trace: [<c18796b3>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x75 [<c103a0e3>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7e/0x95 [<c10bd85a>] ? __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa [<c10bd85a>] ? __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa [<c103a185>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x35 [<c10bd85a>] __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa^M [<c10bed04>] trace_find_cmdline+0x40/0x64 [<c10c3c16>] trace_print_context+0x27/0xec [<c10c4360>] ? trace_seq_printf+0x37/0x5b [<c10c0b15>] print_trace_line+0x319/0x39b [<c10ba3fb>] ? ring_buffer_read+0x47/0x50 [<c10c13b1>] s_show+0x192/0x1ab [<c10bfd9a>] ? s_next+0x5a/0x7c [<c112e76e>] seq_read+0x267/0x34c [<c1115a25>] vfs_read+0x8c/0xef [<c112e507>] ? seq_lseek+0x154/0x154 [<c1115ba2>] SyS_read+0x54/0x7f [<c188488e>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb ---[ end trace 3f507febd6b4cc83 ]--- >>>> ##### CPU 1 buffer started #### Which was the __trace_find_cmdline() function complaining about the pid in the event record being negative. After adding more test cases, this would trigger more often. Strangely enough, it would never trigger on a single test, but instead would trigger only when running all the tests. I believe that was the case because it required one of the tests to be shutting down via delayed instances while a new test started up. After spending several days debugging this, I found that it was caused by the iterator becoming corrupted. Debugging further, I found out why the iterator became corrupted. It happened with the rb_iter_reset(). As consuming reads may not read the full reader page, and only part of it, there's a "read" field to know where the last read took place. The iterator, must also start at the read position. In the rb_iter_reset() code, if the reader page was disconnected from the ring buffer, the iterator would start at the head page within the ring buffer (where writes still happen). But the mistake there was that it still used the "read" field to start the iterator on the head page, where it should always start at zero because readers never read from within the ring buffer where writes occur. I originally wrote a patch to have it set the iter->head to 0 instead of iter->head_page->read, but then I questioned why it wasn't always setting the iter to point to the reader page, as the reader page is still valid. The list_empty(reader_page->list) just means that it was successful in swapping out. But the reader_page may still have data. There was a bug report a long time ago that was not reproducible that had something about trace_pipe (consuming read) not matching trace (iterator read). This may explain why that happened. Anyway, the correct answer to this bug is to always use the reader page an not reset the iterator to inside the writable ring buffer. Fixes: d769041 "ring_buffer: implement new locking" Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 651e22f upstream. When performing a consuming read, the ring buffer swaps out a page from the ring buffer with a empty page and this page that was swapped out becomes the new reader page. The reader page is owned by the reader and since it was swapped out of the ring buffer, writers do not have access to it (there's an exception to that rule, but it's out of scope for this commit). When reading the "trace" file, it is a non consuming read, which means that the data in the ring buffer will not be modified. When the trace file is opened, a ring buffer iterator is allocated and writes to the ring buffer are disabled, such that the iterator will not have issues iterating over the data. Although the ring buffer disabled writes, it does not disable other reads, or even consuming reads. If a consuming read happens, then the iterator is reset and starts reading from the beginning again. My tests would sometimes trigger this bug on my i386 box: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5175 at kernel/trace/trace.c:1527 __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 5175 Comm: grep Not tainted 3.16.0-rc3-test+ #8 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 00000000 00000000 f09c9e1c c18796b3 c1b5d74c f09c9e4c c103a0e3 c1b5154b f09c9e78 00001437 c1b5d74c 000005f7 c10bd85a c10bd85a c1cac57c f09c9eb0 ed0e0000 f09c9e64 c103a185 00000009 f09c9e5c c1b5154b f09c9e78 f09c9e80^M Call Trace: [<c18796b3>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x75 [<c103a0e3>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7e/0x95 [<c10bd85a>] ? __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa [<c10bd85a>] ? __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa [<c103a185>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x35 [<c10bd85a>] __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa^M [<c10bed04>] trace_find_cmdline+0x40/0x64 [<c10c3c16>] trace_print_context+0x27/0xec [<c10c4360>] ? trace_seq_printf+0x37/0x5b [<c10c0b15>] print_trace_line+0x319/0x39b [<c10ba3fb>] ? ring_buffer_read+0x47/0x50 [<c10c13b1>] s_show+0x192/0x1ab [<c10bfd9a>] ? s_next+0x5a/0x7c [<c112e76e>] seq_read+0x267/0x34c [<c1115a25>] vfs_read+0x8c/0xef [<c112e507>] ? seq_lseek+0x154/0x154 [<c1115ba2>] SyS_read+0x54/0x7f [<c188488e>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb ---[ end trace 3f507febd6b4cc83 ]--- >>>> ##### CPU 1 buffer started #### Which was the __trace_find_cmdline() function complaining about the pid in the event record being negative. After adding more test cases, this would trigger more often. Strangely enough, it would never trigger on a single test, but instead would trigger only when running all the tests. I believe that was the case because it required one of the tests to be shutting down via delayed instances while a new test started up. After spending several days debugging this, I found that it was caused by the iterator becoming corrupted. Debugging further, I found out why the iterator became corrupted. It happened with the rb_iter_reset(). As consuming reads may not read the full reader page, and only part of it, there's a "read" field to know where the last read took place. The iterator, must also start at the read position. In the rb_iter_reset() code, if the reader page was disconnected from the ring buffer, the iterator would start at the head page within the ring buffer (where writes still happen). But the mistake there was that it still used the "read" field to start the iterator on the head page, where it should always start at zero because readers never read from within the ring buffer where writes occur. I originally wrote a patch to have it set the iter->head to 0 instead of iter->head_page->read, but then I questioned why it wasn't always setting the iter to point to the reader page, as the reader page is still valid. The list_empty(reader_page->list) just means that it was successful in swapping out. But the reader_page may still have data. There was a bug report a long time ago that was not reproducible that had something about trace_pipe (consuming read) not matching trace (iterator read). This may explain why that happened. Anyway, the correct answer to this bug is to always use the reader page an not reset the iterator to inside the writable ring buffer. Fixes: d769041 "ring_buffer: implement new locking" Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

commit ce75145 upstream. It is possible for ata_sff_flush_pio_task() to set ap->hsm_task_state to HSM_ST_IDLE in between the time __ata_sff_port_intr() checks for HSM_ST_IDLE and before it calls ata_sff_hsm_move() causing ata_sff_hsm_move() to BUG(). This problem is hard to reproduce making this patch hard to verify, but this fix will prevent the race. I have not been able to reproduce the problem, but here is a crash dump from a 2.6.32 kernel. On examining the ata port's state, its hsm_task_state field has a value of HSM_ST_IDLE: crash> struct ata_port.hsm_task_state ffff881c1121c000 hsm_task_state = 0 Normally, this should not be possible as ata_sff_hsm_move() was called from ata_sff_host_intr(), which checks hsm_task_state and won't call ata_sff_hsm_move() if it has a HSM_ST_IDLE value. PID: 11053 TASK: ffff8816e846cae0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "sshd" #0 [ffff88008ba03960] machine_kexec at ffffffff81038f3b #1 [ffff88008ba039c0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810c5d92 #2 [ffff88008ba03a90] oops_end at ffffffff8152b510 #3 [ffff88008ba03ac0] die at ffffffff81010e0b #4 [ffff88008ba03af0] do_trap at ffffffff8152ad74 #5 [ffff88008ba03b50] do_invalid_op at ffffffff8100cf95 #6 [ffff88008ba03bf0] invalid_op at ffffffff8100bf9b [exception RIP: ata_sff_hsm_move+317] RIP: ffffffff813a77ad RSP: ffff88008ba03ca0 RFLAGS: 00010097 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff881c1121dc60 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff881c1121dd10 RSI: ffff881c1121dc60 RDI: ffff881c1121c000 RBP: ffff88008ba03d00 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 000000000000002e R10: 000000000001003f R11: 000000000000009b R12: ffff881c1121c000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000050 R15: ffff881c1121dd78 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff88008ba03d08] ata_sff_host_intr at ffffffff813a7fbd #8 [ffff88008ba03d38] ata_sff_interrupt at ffffffff813a821e #9 [ffff88008ba03d78] handle_IRQ_event at ffffffff810e6ec0

…ther When the bonding is being unloaded and the netdevice notifier is unregistered it executes NETDEV_UNREGISTER for each device which should remove the bond's proc entry but if the device enslaved is not of ARPHRD_ETHER type and is in front of the bonding, it may execute bond_release_and_destroy() first which would release the last slave and destroy the bond device leaving the proc entry and thus we will get the following error (with dynamic debug on for bond_netdev_event to see the events order): [ 908.963051] eql: event: 9 [ 908.963052] eql: IFF_SLAVE [ 908.963054] eql: event: 2 [ 908.963056] eql: IFF_SLAVE [ 908.963058] eql: event: 6 [ 908.963059] eql: IFF_SLAVE [ 908.963110] bond0: Releasing active interface eql [ 908.976168] bond0: Destroying bond bond0 [ 908.976266] bond0 (unregistering): Released all slaves [ 908.984097] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 908.984107] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1787 at fs/proc/generic.c:575 remove_proc_entry+0x112/0x160() [ 908.984110] remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'net/bonding', leaking at least 'bond0' [ 908.984111] Modules linked in: bonding(-) eql(O) 9p nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev qxl drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_generic aesni_intel ttm aes_x86_64 glue_helper pcspkr lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_intel virtio_console snd_hda_codec psmouse serio_raw snd_hwdep snd_hda_core 9pnet_virtio 9pnet evdev joydev drm virtio_balloon snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore i2c_piix4 i2c_core pvpanic acpi_cpufreq parport_pc parport processor thermal_sys button autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 hid_generic usbhid hid sg sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_blk virtio_net floppy ata_piix e1000 libata ehci_pci virtio_pci scsi_mod uhci_hcd ehci_hcd virtio_ring virtio usbcore usb_common [last unloaded: bonding] [ 908.984168] CPU: 0 PID: 1787 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W O 4.2.0-rc2+ hardkernel#8 [ 908.984170] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 908.984172] 0000000000000000 ffffffff81732d41 ffffffff81525b34 ffff8800358dfda8 [ 908.984175] ffffffff8106c521 ffff88003595af78 ffff88003595af40 ffff88003e3a4280 [ 908.984178] ffffffffa058d040 0000000000000000 ffffffff8106c59a ffffffff8172ebd0 [ 908.984181] Call Trace: [ 908.984188] [<ffffffff81525b34>] ? dump_stack+0x40/0x50 [ 908.984193] [<ffffffff8106c521>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xb0 [ 908.984196] [<ffffffff8106c59a>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4a/0x50 [ 908.984199] [<ffffffff81218352>] ? remove_proc_entry+0x112/0x160 [ 908.984205] [<ffffffffa05850e6>] ? bond_destroy_proc_dir+0x26/0x30 [bonding] [ 908.984208] [<ffffffffa057540e>] ? bond_net_exit+0x8e/0xa0 [bonding] [ 908.984217] [<ffffffff8142f407>] ? ops_exit_list.isra.4+0x37/0x70 [ 908.984225] [<ffffffff8142f52d>] ? unregister_pernet_operations+0x8d/0xd0 [ 908.984228] [<ffffffff8142f58d>] ? unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1d/0x30 [ 908.984232] [<ffffffffa0585269>] ? bonding_exit+0x23/0xdba [bonding] [ 908.984236] [<ffffffff810e28ba>] ? SyS_delete_module+0x18a/0x250 [ 908.984241] [<ffffffff81086f99>] ? task_work_run+0x89/0xc0 [ 908.984244] [<ffffffff8152b732>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75 [ 908.984247] ---[ end trace 7c006ed4abbef24b ]--- Thus remove the proc entry manually if bond_release_and_destroy() is used. Because of the checks in bond_remove_proc_entry() it's not a problem for a bond device to change namespaces (the bug fixed by the Fixes commit) but since commit f939981 ("bonding: Don't allow bond devices to change network namespaces.") that can't happen anyway. Reported-by: Carol Soto <clsoto@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Fixes: a64d49c ("bonding: Manage /proc/net/bonding/ entries from the netdev events") Tested-by: Carol L Soto <clsoto@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the following backtrace: PID: 18308 TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rsync" #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152 hardkernel#1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e hardkernel#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5 hardkernel#3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a hardkernel#4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6 hardkernel#5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5 hardkernel#6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f hardkernel#7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445 hardkernel#8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845 hardkernel#9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead hardkernel#10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3 hardkernel#11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff hardkernel#12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f hardkernel#13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be hardkernel#14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423 hardkernel#15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5 hardkernel#16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d hardkernel#17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618 hardkernel#18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b hardkernel#19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297 hardkernel#20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6 hardkernel#21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1 hardkernel#22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c hardkernel#23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8 hardkernel#24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09 hardkernel#25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848 hardkernel#26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7 hardkernel#27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa hardkernel#28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b hardkernel#29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5 hardkernel#30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490 hardkernel#31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199 hardkernel#32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c hardkernel#33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1 hardkernel#34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91 hardkernel#35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32 hardkernel#36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5 hardkernel#37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc hardkernel#38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e hardkernel#39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e hardkernel#40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89 Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by PG_writeback right away. The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs was specified. The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the __GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs code. But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away. ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily submit the bio. Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes. Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2) before we go to wait on the writeback. The page fault path, which is the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic. As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem. Moreover he notes: : For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion : which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The : writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten : extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on : page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not : safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9+ [tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow] Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

hardkernel and others added 30 commits January 10, 2013 11:01

Fix build error if enable xfs or btfs

868d550

irda: sir_dev: Fix copy/paste typo

98ffdcd

[ Upstream commit 2355a62 ] Signed-off-by: Alexander Shiyan <shc_work@mail.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

usb: gadget: phonet: free requests in pn_bind()'s error path

42fac8e

commit d0eca71 upstream. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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Merge Linux 3.0.58#8

Merge Linux 3.0.58#8
hardkernel merged 51 commits intohardkernel:odroid-3.0.yfrom
zehome:odroid-3.0.y

zehome commented Jan 12, 2013

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zehome commented Jan 12, 2013

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